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In our Age of Information, it’s easy to get used to
having numbers at your fingertips. Elections are no
different. There is a dizzying array of websites and
portals dedicated to the political junkie, collecting,
aggregating and distilling the results of hundreds of
pre-election polls, news stories and expert
commentary. In the aftermath of the election,
however, when the results come in, the situation
changes dramatically. 
For the analyst, activist, scholar and policy maker who
want to assess not who won or lost, but how well the
system performed, appropriate data can be
frustratingly difficult to find and exceedingly time
consuming to assemble. This makes monitoring and
improving election performance in the United States
unnecessarily difficult. 
While the clash of values over election reform is the
stuff of politics, political debates should not be
handicapped by unavailable and unreliable elections
data.
In May 2008, the Pew Center on the States’ Make
Voting Work initiative and the JEHT Foundation
assembled a broad set of stakeholders with the
expertise to comment on the importance and
challenges of prioritizing, collecting and applying
elections data to provide and improve information for
the public on election performance and management.
(The conference program and attendees are listed in
the appendix).
The goal of the Data for Democracy conference was to
start a conversation. This compendium broadens that
conversation to a larger audience of policymakers,
academics, advocates and elections officials. 
The compendium includes:
● A set of overview essays that address broad-
ranging issues of elections data collection, usage
and management.
● A set of topic essays that deal with seven specific
areas of elections data reporting, each including a
set of detailed policy recommendations.
● A 50-state assessment of data reporting, covering
two areas: voter registration and history files,
comparing the cost and comprehensiveness of
these files; and state response rates to the federally
mandated U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Election Administration and Election Day Survey
conducted in 2006.
The compendium strives to advance the study of
election information by assessing the scope of data
reporting. The assessment highlights those states that
do a particularly robust job of data collection and
reporting; comments on the challenges facing other
states in emulating those models; and examines the
diversity of both data and data collection mechanisms
among local governments within states.
We hope this compendium will provide helpful insight
for policy debates in Congress; for the Election
Assistance Commission as they think about their own
data collection efforts; for state legislatures as they
consider reform legislation; and for state and local
election officials in their implementation and
maintenance of our election system.
We would like to thank the following people for their
tremendous contributions to the Data for Democracy
project:
Alysoun McLaughlin, who organized the conference
and was integral in engaging state and local election
officials;
Dan Seligson of electionline.org, and Sharon Nuskey of
the Pew Center on the States who, along with Paul
Gronke, made sure this compendium reached
completion by editing, drafting essays and
communicating with authors.
The staff of the Early Voting Information Center (EVIC)
at Reed College, including Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum,
James Hicks, and Bailey Schreiber, who worked behind
the scenes throughout;
The Alta S. Corbett Fund at Reed College, which
funded Bailey Schreiber to oversee the assessment
aspect of Data for Democracy.
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This compendium — and the Data for
Democracy conference from which it derives —
rests on a single bedrock assumption: better data
is a foundation for any meaningful effort to
understand and improve the functioning of the
American election system.
Indeed, data is vitally important to any
undertaking and matters tremendously in
choosing the direction and assessing the success
of an endeavor. This is a fundamental tenet of the
move toward evidence-based management
across sectors and professions. 
Data is not valuable in and of itself; its value
resides in what it makes possible in the hands of
thoughtful and creative analysts and decision-
makers. It gives us a sixth sense, another way to
view the challenges and opportunities that lie
ahead.
Data matters because it expands and sharpens
our view of the world and turns that focus on us
as well, clarifying our thinking and reasoning.
Specifically:
Data provides context and counterpoint for the
strong forces that color decision-making.
Elections are not the only field dominated by
powerful political and emotional forces that steer
debate through the telling and re-telling of
anecdotes in the policy arena. 
Anecdotal evidence (or “anecdata”)1 is better
suited to storytelling than dispassionate analysis.
My journalist colleagues at Pew’s electionline.org
remind me that the media generally isn’t
interested in planes that don’t crash or houses
that don’t burn. This is why these stories do not
typically appear on the front page of a
newspaper or the lead story of a broadcast.
The problem, of course, is that the beautiful
disaster can be (and frequently is) mistaken for
the state of affairs everywhere. Reality is usually
much less beautiful, much less disastrous, and
much less newsworthy. 
In these situations, data becomes what Steve
Weir, Contra Costa County Clerk-Recorder, calls
“an antidote to an anecdote.” 
Data will never replace these anecdotes —
policymaking being an exercise in storytelling,
after all — but the commitment to collecting and
analyzing data offers an opportunity to balance
perceptions with measurement via context. 
Data offers a consistent and ongoing foundation
for assessing the success of an endeavor. 
Anyone launching a business, mounting a policy
initiative or trying to run an election will want to
know how well it’s going. Reliable, repeated, and
transparent data collection efforts are the starting
point.
Properly designed, a data-gathering effort can
also be used to identify, diagnose and react to
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events in real time. One voter in the wrong
polling place is unfortunate; many voters with the
same problem suggests something else is amiss.
In these situations, data is like a thermometer in a
child’s mouth. The body temperature it reports is
data that illuminates a larger condition that may
or may not need immediate attention.
Data forces us to think systematically, bringing
values to the surface. 
Deciding what data to collect and how to obtain
it requires the kind of systematic thinking that
focuses inquiry in a powerful (and thus useful)
way. Words like “profitability,” “customer
satisfaction,” even “fairness” or “equality” are so
value-laden (and thus likely to mean different
things to different people) that the commitment
to data and data measurement forces those
values to the surface. 
Consider the controversy over requirements for
identification at the polls. The 2008 U.S. Supreme
Court decision upholding Indiana’s photo ID
requirements rekindled debates about how data
might shed some light on the issue. Indeed,
Spencer Overton of The George Washington
University has written convincingly about the need
to approach voter identification with a sense of
cost-benefit analysis — using empirical data about
both fraud and disenfranchisement to weigh the
impact of any new law such as photo ID.2
But collecting some data involves value
judgments as well. 
If we believe that ID requirements are a barrier
not only to registered voters but to eligible
unregistered citizens, then we would want to
look at the impact of ID requirements on that
population. If, on the other hand, we are
concerned not just about impersonation fraud (A
pretending to be B) but also eligibility fraud 
(C pretending to be of age, a citizen, or a resident
when he/she is not) then we have to assess the
impact of ID on potential fraud by that larger set
of people. We need to choose carefully; too much
data could lead to weak conclusions that satisfy
few and frustrate many.
We also need to understand that data merely
illuminates problems. It does not solve them.
Disagreements over values are resolved in the
political arena — but data helps put flesh on the
bones of what is often a skeletal debate over
values.
A new law that will enfranchise hundreds of new
voters but also opens the door to dozens of
fraudulent votes will be acceptable to some and
an anathema to others. Conversely, measures
preventing fraud but also preventing otherwise
eligible voters from casting ballots will spark
similar disagreement. Data helps put these
discussions on an empirical level, but the
decisions themselves will go far beyond the data.
Still, these disagreements are better, not worse,
for the availability of data.
The articles that follow are a first step toward
creating a culture of evidence-based election
administration, a real-world application of the
notion of Data for Democracy. On behalf of all of
us at Make Voting Work, electionline.org, and the
Pew Center on the States, we thank the authors
for their effort.
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Dan Seligson, electionline.org, Pew Center on the States
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The use of data collection in election
administration is a relatively new field, prompted
by the controversial 2000 election and the
resulting Help America Vote Act. 
In the last six years, however, collecting and using
data have increased. The best-known recent
example is probably the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission’s Election Day Survey. The data
collection effort — discussed in detail elsewhere
in this publication — is the vehicle through
which the federal agency can meet its mandate
“to serve as a national clearinghouse and
resource for the compilation of information and
review of procedures with respect to the
administration of federal elections.”3
While the Election Day Survey represents a
massive data collection effort on a national scale
— involving more than 3,000 jurisdictions and
scores of survey questions — less ambitious
efforts have been underway in localities around
the country with eye-opening results. 
Examples have included surveys of local election
officials, analyses of voter-wait times in Northern
California, examinations of turnout by hour at
vote centers in Indiana, observations of the
performance of electronic poll books in Maryland
and an electronic election reporting system in
Arizona.
Berkeley Wait-Time Study
A team of graduate students at the Goldman
School of Public Policy at the University of
California-Berkeley wanted to find out why lines
formed at polling places. The question is basic,
but requires detailed observation to get
information beyond anecdotes. 
In 2008, teams of 120 student volunteers traveled
to three California counties to observe and record
the functioning of polling places during the
presidential primary. Teams of two observers
recorded arrival and departure rates, the number
of people in line at all times, and the number of
poll workers engaged in assisting voters. Spikes in
activity, they posited, would help explain
differences in service rates. 
They also surveyed poll workers, seeking basic
information including age, education and sex. In
all, more than 2,000 voters were tracked and 153
questionnaires were administered. 
The preliminary findings indicate that the
evening rush represents the busiest time for
voting, with 25 percent of all voters casting
ballots between 5 p.m and 7 p.m. Researchers
also discovered there are few last-minute voters,
with new arrivals dropping drastically after 7:30
p.m. (polls in California close at 8 p.m.).4
Other findings:
 Voting on DRE machines took significantly
longer than casting an optical-scan ballot. On
average, San Mateo County voters took four-
and-a-half minutes to cast their vote on eSlate
DRE voting machines. Napa County voters,
who cast paper optical-scan ballots centrally
counted at the end of the day, took just over
three minutes. Precinct-count optical-scan
ballots in Alameda County took voters just
under three-and-a-half minutes to cast.5
Maryland’s Electronic Poll-Book
Check-in Study
State officials in Maryland undertook a similar
study with a broader sample. With 5,500
electronic poll books deployed for the September
2006 primary, election administrators were able
to receive a number of different data sets, many
of them illuminating for future elections.
Just as Berkeley students used their clipboards to
find out who checked in and when in California
counties, electronic poll books allowed Maryland
administrators to track voting patterns
throughout the day. The information they
received was similar to the sample in California,
except with direct feedback from e-poll books in
use throughout the state.
The information ranged from the trivial — 11
percent of male voters cast ballots within the first
hour that polls were open — to the unexpected;
the patterns of the youngest voters (18-24 years
old) were nearly identical to the oldest (65 years
plus).
DATA FOR MANAGEMENT
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As part of an investigation into voter wait times in three California counties, graduate students at University of California, Berkeley tallied when voters arrived at polls and
cast ballots during the February 2008 election. They noted that while polls were open for 13 hours on Election Day, a quarter of all voters cast ballots suring a two-hour
period from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. They also found voting activity was almost non-existent in the final 30 minutes. Their data matched similar findings in Maryland, also indicating a
sharp drop in participation during the last hour of voting. Such information could assist voting jurisdictions in making staffing decisions.
(Zachary Markovits and Douglas Spenser, University of California-Berkeley.)
Most importantly for management, however, is
that the data suggests how best to use limited
resources to meet what appears to be
predictable voter demand. 
“The state has discovered that precincts tend to
fall into distinct groups of hourly turnout
patterns…and that these patterns seem to hold
true from one election to the next. Given that the
supply of voting equipment and poll workers is
limited, and given the goal of minimizing line
lengths and wait times, the hourly turnout profile
data has provided a useful tool for allocating
election-day resources,” a state report noted. 
Maricopa County, Arizona’s
Election Reporting System
The challenges of managing thousands of pieces
of information from voters, poll workers, field
trouble shooters, political party observers, city
clerks, town clerks and staff members on Election
Day led Maricopa County, Arizona to institute an
electronic Election Reporting System. This single
online repository, officials say, has become an
indispensable tool. 
Not only is it a more effective substitute for
tracking information on paper call slips on
Election Day — when feedback on the
convenience of a polling place, the efficacy of
signage, performance of poll workers and
subsequent reaction time can be critical — but it
allows for up-to-the-minute trend analysis that
previously was time-consuming and usually
occurred after Election Day. The system responds
to increasing public interest in the conduct of
elections, problem resolution, accountability
tracking and results reporting. It consolidates and
centralizes information and allows rapid input
from multiple locations, instant notification for
timely resolution and summary analysis — with
numerous sorting and reporting abilities available
to local officials throughout three locations in the
county. 
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The county finds that this system effectively
provides quantifiable documentation to support
or debunk proposals in election related
legislation, media reports, and administrative
decisions. It allows employees to spend more
time analyzing, not gathering, data in order to
continually improve election administration. 
Local Election Official Survey
A February 2008 survey of approximately 1,400
local election officials sponsored by the
Congressional Research Service was undertaken
following the 2004 and 2006 federal elections.6 It
revealed much about the American election
system through the eyes of the ones responsible
for administering the vote7 — largely middle-
aged white women earning under $50,000 a year.
Election officials are leery of the influence of the
federal government, the media and political
parties in decisions about voting-system usage
while being highly satisfied with the equipment
being used in their jurisdictions. Those
administrators who have used lever-voting
machines were particularly satisfied. Those using
direct-recording electronic (DRE or touch-screen
machines) and optical-scan systems were less so,
particularly in 2006.8
While not offering any concrete recommendations
for polling-place management, the study
nonetheless provides a window into attitudes of
election officials, particularly concerning
satisfaction with voting systems. It also looks at
attitudes toward training, voter-verified paper
audit trails with electronic voting systems, difficulty
in implementing HAVA and other issues. 
DATA  F O R  MA N A G E M E N T
Basic Principles of Data Collection
Paul Gronke, Reed College and Charles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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As Doug Chapin notes in the opening to this
compendium, “better data is a foundation for any
meaningful effort to understand and improve the
functioning of the American election system.”
Cases highlighted in this compendium show how
data has helped election officials allocate staff
and voting machines, determine early and
Election Day voting locations as well as
proactively address trouble spots on Election Day.
The Data for Democracy conference participants
and authors point to ways that better-quality
election data can help us register more citizens,
attract more voters, count more ballots, and
reduce polling place incidents. 
All of this is empty rhetoric, however, without
high-quality data that is applicable, accessible
and usable by elections officials, policy makers,
advocates, citizens and scholars. 
While election reforms since HAVA have, in many
ways, transformed how elections are conducted
in the United States, increased scrutiny and
funding have not yielded better systematic
measures by which we can judge the
effectiveness of these reforms. 
Without systematic measures of election
performance, we don’t know if any of the goals of
election reform have been met.9 We don’t know
whether elections are run any better in 2008 than
they were eight years ago.
In this essay, we identify four principles for
gathering and reporting data that will improve
the quality, accessibility and usability of elections
data.10 We show how each can play a valuable
role in elections data collection. We end by
highlighting the continuing challenges to
collecting and reporting high-quality elections
data. 
Data Collection Principles
Uniformity: The most important ingredient in
valid data analysis is data that is readily
comparable across the units being studied. The
biggest barrier to using data to improve elections
in America is that states, counties and cities
adopt different definitions for the most basic
concepts in election administration. What passes
for “voter turnout” in South Carolina is different
from turnout in Kansas. To improve American
elections, election jurisdictions must adopt a
common set of definitions and metrics for
elections data. As Michael McDonald points out
later in this compendium, failing to do so
undermines our ability to make even the most
basic comparisons of turnout across states and
over time.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
and professional associations of state and local
elections officials can make substantial
contributions by working to establish common
definitions for the most frequently measured
elections data elements.
DATA  F O R  MA N A G E M E N T
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Registering to vote
Did the voter’s registration card arrive in the mail — at both ends? Did it contain errors?
Did the office clerk process everything correctly?
2 Checking in at the polling place
Was the registration properly processed?
Did the voter come to the correct precinct?
Does the voter have an identification problem?
Casting the ballot
Is the voting machine working properly?
Does the voter understand how to use the machine?
How high are residual vote rates?
Counting the votes
How do the officials deal with ambiguity?
How do states conduct audits, and on what 
scale — if they do so at all?
How can we confirm accurately recorded voter 
intent, given the secret ballot process?
1
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Improving elections in the United States requires that we collect applicable
data at every link in the voting chain, because a breakdown at any link can
abrogate a citizen’s voting rights. 
Transparency: In all areas of governmental
performance, a basic principle of holding officials
accountable is making data related to that
performance not only readily available to citizens,
but in a form they can easily understand. In the
great explosion of election reform that occurred
in the Progressive Era in the early 20th century,
states accompanied reforms by publishing
voluminous data to document elections,
including data about turnout and election
returns, often at the precinct level. 
A century later, most states are still stuck in a
series of data practices that have not advanced
past the horse-and-buggy age. Given the power
of the software that is now used to help tabulate
elections, there is no reason why these reports
cannot be routinely reported in very fine detail,
such as at the precinct level, or by breaking out
results according to mode of voting (in-precinct,
early, absentee, etc.) and published online in a
way that can be imported into basic data-analysis
software.
DATA  F O R  MA N A G E M E N T
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Election data should be electronically available in
well-documented and easily accessible formats,
as part of the public record. In our 50-state
comparison, we found wide disparities in the fees
states charge political parties and candidates for
voter registration files. We also found that some
of these files were poorly documented and
provided in data formats that only experienced
analysts could use. 
State elections offices should take the lead in
helping make registration figures, turnout by all
modes, voting machine usage, audit results, and
other key data easily and readily accessible. State
legislatures should make certain that elections
offices have sufficient resources to meet this
transparency requirement.
Speed: For voting to be an effective tool of
governmental accountability, there must be a
relatively small window between when elections
are conducted and when officials take office. Yet
this narrow window also puts a premium on
reporting detailed election data, allowing all
stakeholders sufficient time to check for
inconsistencies in the current election and to
prepare for the next one.
Multiple Sources: An important principle of
effective oversight is having multiple perspectives
from which to judge government activity. The most
fundamental source of data used to assess how
well elections are run is the results themselves, but
election data provides only one perspective from
which to assess the quality of election
administration.
While registration rolls and election returns form
the core of elections data, federal, state, and local
officials need to think creatively about better
ways to collect information about the
performance of the elections system. Examples
include random sample surveys of local elections
officials and of the population (Make Voting Work
is currently funding just such a survey), and even
structured observation at the polling place.
Challenges and Obstacles
The Challenge of Diversity: There are 10,071
jurisdictions in the nation that conduct elections
on a regular basis. Slightly more than 3,100 of
them are counties; nearly 7,000 are towns,
townships and cities in New England, Michigan,
Minnesota and Wisconsin. Their size and
complexity varies dramatically — over half have
fewer than 1,400 registered voters, and 7,654 of
the 10,071 have fewer than 10,000 registered
voters. At the other extreme, 340 jurisdictions
have more than 100,000 registered voters and 15
counties have more than one million registered
voters.11 Tailoring a one-size-fits-all set of data
collection standards and procedures is a
daunting prospect.
The Challenge of Federalism: Diversity in size is
matched, if not exceeded, by diversity in laws,
procedures, and administrative capacities.
Kenneth Mayer, professor of Political Science at
the University of Wisconsin, recently wrote of his
year studying and lecturing about election reform
in Australia:
When I described electoral practices in the U.S., these
international audiences were genuinely stunned
about the voting process here, finding it difficult to
believe that we leave the administrative machinery
largely in the hands of thousands of openly partisan
state and local officials.12
While we are not taking a position here on the
issues of partisan election officials, there is no
denying the fact that federalism is a major
obstacle in the way of improving the quality of
elections data. The source of many of the
conflicting definitions resides in state laws and in
state and local procedures, and, unfortunately,
many well-intentioned improvements in data
reporting can get caught in the buzz saw of
partisan competition.
The Challenge of Money: While many
jurisdictions — particularly large ones — are
well-staffed and have highly professionalized
information technology departments, other
elections departments are staffed by single, part-
DATA  F O R  MA N A G E M E N T
Election data has been traditionally thought of
as consisting of three kinds of information;
voter registration rolls, election results and
post-election auditing materials. However,
some scholars have recently suggested a new
alternative — sending observers to the polling
places to monitor line lengths, time voters and
to record information about precinct activities.
While we don’t expect this to be adopted
nationwide, it is a new and creative way to
think about elections data collection.
In 2006, researchers from Utah and Ohio used
a method of structured observation to assess
conditions at the polling locations in those
two states. Structured observation is
“systematic, careful observation based on
written rules [which] explain how to categorize
and classify observations.”13
Observational data can provide valuable
information about polling place conditions
that is unobtainable by other methods and
that can help improve election administration.
First, structured observation allows for
replication of studies and improves the
reliability of results.14
Second, observers can be trained to measure
specific aspects of the voting experience,
whereas within the limits of survey questions
voters’ or poll workers’ judgments about these
aspects are less standardized and less reliable.
Third, structured observation provides
researchers an opportunity to be precise and
to develop more objective documentation of
abstract concepts related to the voting
experience. Finally, structured observation can
benefit from random sampling that allows
generalizations beyond the set of polling
places observed.
While there are many advantages to structured
observation, election officials and researchers
should be aware of some disadvantages.
Because structured observation alone cannot
reveal the intentions of individuals, it should
be combined with other data on polling place
administration. Second, structured observation
may raise ethical concerns if there are possible
risks to a subject’s confidentiality. Election
officials and voters may understandably have
heightened sensitivity to this issue.
THE ROLE OF STRUC TURED OBSERVATION IN ELEC TION RESEARCH
Kelly Patterson, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University
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time recorders and clerks. In a recent survey of
local elections officials, more than half reported
spending less than 20 hours/week on elections-
related duties, and over 60 percent made less
than $40,000 annually.15 Many election
departments are already operating with severely
constrained budgets, so any improvements in
data reporting will ideally improve the conduct
and reduce the costs of elections. 
Improving elections in the United States requires
that we collect applicable data at every link in the
voting chain, because a breakdown at any link
can abrogate a citizen’s voting rights. 
Most states have a well-developed data
collection capacity at some points along the
chain, such as voter registration. But at other links,
data is virtually nonexistent, such as the length of
time voters spend checking in and waiting in line,
or the accuracy of ballot counting.
Improving Elections Through Metrics and Measurement
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The Issue
Despite heightened public scrutiny of election
officials since November 2000 and dramatic
changes in election administration nationwide,
there has been far more research on the
machinery of democracy than its management.
The study of elections focuses primarily on law
and technology with comparatively little
attention to such questions as: How are elections
financed? Who administers them? Who are the
poll workers in whose hands voters entrust their
ballots on Election Day? What motivates poll
workers? How do they make decisions under
pressure? How can they be effectively trained and
managed to perform such critical tasks without
direct supervision? 
Elections are an increasingly complicated
function of government that requires dedicated
personnel, professional management and
technological savvy. Citizens now demand a
flawless, transparent election process. Striving
toward that goal strains the resources of
jurisdictions that have new and unexpected
financial demands to administer elections; the
capacity and imagination of local officials who are
overseeing election logistics in a constantly
changing environment; and, the patience and
agility of poll workers who must keep up with
myriad changing legal requirements,
technologies and procedures. 
Current Practices
Dialogue and research on election administration
primarily focus on election results, technology
and specific responsibilities and requirements
that are dictated by state laws and regulations.
That lens fails to bring day-to-day management
of election operations into focus, obscuring a
broad diversity of practices and an enormous
disparity of resources both within and across
states. Both significantly impact the voter’s
experience on Election Day. 
Studying election administration at the local level
in a comprehensive manner is challenging. (See
page 10, “Challenge of Diversity” for details.) 
It is hardly surprising that most dialogue and
research on election administration focus on the
largest jurisdictions, where the primary local
election official may earn a six-figure income and
oversee a staff of hundreds. However, large
jurisdictions provide just one lens through which
we can view election administration. Focusing
exclusively on the challenges they face neglects
important management issues in smaller
jurisdictions and rural areas. 
Local election officials in jurisdictions with more
than a million voters and dedicated information
technology staff face entirely different challenges
in securing, maintaining and operating voting
technology than their brethren in smaller
jurisdictions. In many rural areas, election
How Data Can Improve Elections
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administrators are not full-time employees and
often lack information technology expertise and
a dedicated facility for warehousing that
equipment. Election functions in rural areas are
frequently handled not by a separate department
but as one of many tasks. Rural jurisdictions are
likely to elect officials, while urban areas tend to
appoint an individual or board to administer
elections.16 Larger jurisdictions also hold more
elections than smaller jurisdictions.17
Unlike more established areas of expertise such as
public health management and law enforcement,
election administrators have few professional
development resources at their disposal.18
According to the Congressional Research Service:
● The typical local election official is a white
woman between 50 and 60 years old who is a
high school graduate. 
● She was elected to her current office, works
full-time in election administration, has been in
the profession for about 10 years, and earns
under $50,000 per year 
● Two-thirds are elected rather than appointed. 
The profile of election administrators is changing
rapidly. The field is experiencing a turnover rate of
about 10 percent each election cycle. From 2004
to 2006, local election officials who: 1) were
elected decreased from 65 percent to 58
percent;19 2) worked full-time increased from 66
percent to 76 percent; and, 3) spent more than 20
hours per week on election duties increased from
41 percent to 47 percent. Those who had served
for more than a decade in their current position
decreased from 47 percent to 44 percent and
those earning a salary under $40,000 decreased
from 47 percent to 39 percent.20
Less is known about the approximately 1.4
million poll workers who serve as the “street-level
bureaucrats” of election administration.21 On
Election Day, this largely volunteer army is
entrusted with the custody and management of
ballots, responsible for determining who is
eligible to vote; ensuring that each voter casts
only one ballot; and making certain that
provisional ballots are used appropriately.22
Anecdotally, many jurisdictions report that their
costs for administering elections have doubled,
tripled or even quadrupled since enactment of
the Help America Vote Act.
In testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on House Administration, Ray Feikert,
former county commissioner of Holmes County,
Ohio, testified that in his rural jurisdiction, it cost
approximately $4,000 to run a special election for
school board before enactment of the Help
America Vote Act. That price tag increased to
more than $20,000 by 2007 because of costs for
personnel, training and storage or service
contracts on new voting equipment. The diversity
of practices in cost accounting makes nationwide
comparison and trend analysis difficult.
In many cases, costs are shared among different
constitutional offices within a local jurisdiction
and they can often be difficult to parse from
other functions of a local office. Primary elections,
municipal elections, recounts, and other
significant cost drivers in some cases are borne
by the administering jurisdiction and at other
times are administered directly by, or are billed to,
a local jurisdiction, political party or candidate. 
For many jurisdictions, election performance
management is more an art than a science. There
Data for Democracy | Pew Center on the States14
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has been little quantitative study of broader
practices in election performance measurement
and management. 
Challenges 
Our election system faces significant 
management challenges. The rapid pace of 
change, implementation of new technology, and
escalating public demand for flawless election
administration and a choice of voting methods are
placing enormous pressures on policymakers,
administrators and poll workers in a difficult budget
environment. Recognition of that strain, however,
provides new opportunities for innovation in voting
methods and administrative practices. Good
elections data can help this process.
Improving elections requires an unaccustomed
level of commitment to performance management.
Elections are notoriously messy; the logistical
challenges of administering them in multiple
locations on a single day make it difficult to
supervise front-line employees in a traditional
manner. The unpredictability of elections — from
the weather to traffic jams to last-minute court
decisions — contributes to a sense of learned
helplessness among many officials, who perceive
the ultimate success or failure of an election as
being largely outside their control. In addition,
because election management occurs in a high
stakes, highly politicized environment, many officials
are reluctant to move toward more rigorous
performance measurement that would shine a
spotlight on failure and embarrass poll workers or
staff when failures are not significant enough to
have changed the outcome of an election.
As policymakers increasingly back away from
quick fixes and focus on structural reform of
election procedures; as election officials
increasingly focus on demonstrating what works
and what doesn’t to external audiences of activists
and policymakers; and, as researchers increasingly
focus on election management as well as law and
technology, more and better data will help inform
election policy and the performance. But this
progression is still in its infancy.
Recommendations 
● More research is needed to help us better
understand election administration: not simply
how the law says elections should be run, but
how they are actually conducted in polling
places. The role of poll workers as “street-level
bureaucrats” — front-line personnel who actively
interpret and reinvent laws in administering
them — must be better understood and
incorporated into decisionmaking. Otherwise,
they will “modify their objectives to match their
ability to perform.”23
● As the tasks of administering elections become
more complex, state and local governments
need to assess the critical responsibilities and
required skills. They should evaluate their
existing training and provide professional
development opportunities for officials and
poll workers. 
● Officials should use evidence-based data to
identify meaningful and achievable
benchmarks for performance and success. 
● Officials must account for and report on the
costs of election management, especially
when implementing new reforms or absorbing
extraordinary expenditures. Researchers and
advocates must understand the financial and
administrative costs of any reform, as well as its
proximate effects, replicability and interaction
with other aspects of the process.24
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Election data can play a role in lawmaking on
Capitol Hill, but timing, content and relevancy are
critical. 
Data is integral to policy making, but is of
greatest utility to policy makers when it relates
clearly to current issues, constituent concerns or
oversight of previously enacted legislation.
In short, data that is relevant, properly gathered
and critically analyzed can contribute to 
informed and effective policy making. Conversely,
its absence can lead to poor decisions and
misspent funds. 
Election data — either statistical or derived from
experimental research — has the potential to
shape and inform policy debates. Debates about
appropriations bills could be elevated by hard
statistical data about the costs of implementing
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requirements —
information that is not currently available (and
that did not inform the initial passage of HAVA). A
paucity of accurate and meaningful data makes it
difficult to assess the policy implications of many
of the election administration issues before
Congress, including absentee voting, voter
identification, allocation of equipment among
polling places and poll worker competence. 
The absence of such vital information may result
in insufficient financing and effectively impose an
unfunded mandate on states. Another potential
consequence is overfunding, which 
arguably wastes federal dollars or, at a minimum,
diverts them from other priorities. 
Cost information is often lacking and creates
problems during debates about bills that would
impose new requirements on the states. An
example is the proposal to require voter-verifiable
paper ballot records to address concerns about
the security and reliability of direct-recording
electronic (DRE) voting systems. The costs of
implementing such a mandate are unclear — as
are the benefits. While the media focus on
problems with DREs, two recent national surveys
found very little difference in local election
officials’ ratings of both the security and reliability
of voting systems. Regardless of the system they
used, they rated them very highly.
Experimental research data that is relevant to
elections and useful to policy makers is even
more scarce than accurate statistical information.
This deficit — in the absence of a well-
established field of election science — is
especially difficult to address. 
Constraints in Election 
Data Collection
Whether statistical or experimental, data must be
scientifically valid in order to be useful, and the
complexities of election administration make it
difficult to conduct studies that are both useful
and valid. The Congressional Research Service
wrestled with many of these issues while
designing our surveys of local elections officials
(LEOs).
How Data Improves Policymaking
Eric Fischer, Congressional Research Service
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State and local variations in administrative setups
— some states have as few as 10 LEOs, while
others have more than 1,000 – complicate the
design of surveys of LEOs. 
For example, a random sample of the total
number of election officials in the country would
result in a disproportionate number of Wisconsin
officials, because Wisconsin’s LEOs constitute 25
percent of LEOs nationwide. Yet, in terms of total
population, Wisconsin constitutes just 1.8 percent
of the country.
Alternative ways to weight the data (according to
state, voting-age population or portion of LEOs)
would present similar problems. Absent a simple
solution, the two surveys employed a sampling
strategy to reasonably balance population and
geographic representation. The strategy increases
the relative influence of states with fewer LEOs
while ensuring a relatively strong influence of
those with large numbers. 
Some observers may argue that this casts doubt
on the utility of the results. Yet the inherent
complexity requires that data collection efforts
are carefully designed and necessitates
compromise. Only data that is accurate, reliable,
and appropriately designed with policymakers in
mind can help guide decision making. 
Campaigns care most about the election data
that comes from precincts when polls close. But
they also rely heavily on other data in shaping
their strategies. 
Indeed, the foundation of every campaign
strategy is data about the electorate. 
Campaign data comes via computerized voter
files, often accessed through online database
interfaces with sophisticated selection, mapping
and analysis tools. However, this data is not all
that different from the note cards in a shoebox
held by precinct captains. Like the note cards, it
reveals who is registered and who votes. The
difference today is that the data is much more
widely, rapidly, and, one would hope, more
cheaply, available.
Campaigns make use of both aggregate data (e.g.
prior election returns by precinct) and individual
level data about voters. Aggregate-level data is
vitally important for high-level strategic decisions
in campaigns, so accuracy is essential. 
Acquiring election data is expensive for
campaigns in both time and money. But the
investment pays off in targeted, efficient
communication with registered voters — the
population candidates most want to reach. No
campaign wishes to reach every voter in the
electorate, and certainly not with every
communication. At the simplest level, campaigns
don’t want to waste precious resources on
individuals who cannot cast a ballot. Selecting
registered voters depends on accurate and up-to-
date voter registration rolls.
Campaigns craft communication strategies
around the understanding that all voters are not
equally likely to cast a ballot. 
Two types are priorities for communication:
undecided ones who are highly likely to vote and
supporters who are unlikely to turn out. The
measurement of undecided and supporters relies
on campaign data, including polling and micro-
targeting, but the likelihood of voting relies on
information about past voting history and, to a
lesser extent, date of registration. Voters of many
other types are targeted for various reasons, but the
likelihood of voting always plays a role in selection.
To a casual observer, the solution is easy: simply
head to your county or state election office and pick
up a copy of the voter file. However, anyone with
experience working with voter files will tell you that
this solution is far from adequate — the barriers are
illustrated well in the 50-state assessment included
in this compendium (see page 50).
Election officials face a data-management task far
larger and more complicated than any in the
consumer world, yet catalogs, online shopping
sites and banks all invest significantly more
resources in data management.
The accuracy, timeliness and hygiene of election
data are vital to good campaigning. Unfortunately,
despite the goals, incentives and penalties of the
How Data Improves Campaign
Strategy 
Christopher Mann, MHSC Partners and Yale University
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Help America Vote Act, data management practices
for election data remain highly fragmented. 
Within some states, counties differ in how they
track vote history, update registrations, purge
registrations and maintain other critical data. 
Despite considerable investment by the parties in
national voter files, campaigns still rely heavily on
people with local knowledge to standardize and
scrub election data. 
A wish list 
Political campaigns can’t have everything. They
expect to pay for the data they need to win
elections. However, campaigners have extensive
experience in the uses — and abuses — of elections
data. I provide a short wish list for campaigns, but I
think it will benefit every user of election data,
including election administrators themselves.
Keep it fresh. Accurate information, timely
updates and standard definitions and practices
top the list for campaigners. 
They want frequently updated lists with
consistent formats at a reasonable price. States
sometimes wait weeks or months for one
overdue county before making the statewide file
available, leaving campaigns in painful limbo
about decision-making.
Keep it clean. Basic data hygiene procedures find
large numbers of duplicate records based on
name, address, date of birth, other unique
identifiers and combinations of these factors,
making unclean rolls quite unwieldy. This
duplication causes headaches for the campaigns
that must try to sort out the arbitrary on-the-fly
decisions made about duplicate records by
election administrators in order to get accurate
information for their own decision making. 
One of the most common reasons that files
become bloated is voters who have changed
residences. The United States Postal Service offers
a National Change of Address (NCOA) database
with forwarding addresses, but few election
agencies compare their files with it. Public
agencies could use NCOA matches to update
registration or mailing addresses or to contact
voters to do so themselves. 
No paper trail exists for voters who are purged
from the rolls, and one would be beneficial.
Information about the reason for removal, for
example, is of great value to campaigns, voter
protection advocates and others interested in the
conduct of elections. In computerized databases,
keeping these purged records and the reasons for
removal would require only a trivial cost for hard
drive storage.
Keep it consistent. Among the most maddening
idiosyncrasies in voter files is the treatment of
registration dates. Some election officials record
the date when the registration is entered into the
computer rather than when it is received — often
weeks or months after a voter may have cast a
ballot. 
The delay in entering registrations creates
additional provisional ballots, and over the long
term causes confusion in the voting records of
individual voters. 
Keep the history. Many jurisdictions do an
excellent job of retaining vote history, while others
do little or none. This information — including the
type of voting (Election Day, early, mail, provisional)
— is critical for campaigns. The information is
valuable not only for general elections, but also for
primaries, special elections and local elections.
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How Data is Used by Advocates
Justin Levitt, The Brennan Center for Justice, New York University
In many respects, data is an election advocate’s
lifeblood. Data helps advocates identify and
diagnose problems and opportunities, set
priorities, persuade policymakers, generate
publicity, secure relief from the courts and
monitor policy change and compliance.
Diagnosis
Advocates strive for tangible impact; few have
the luxury of time or resources to devote
attention to practices that seem suboptimal but
are not overtly harmful. There are substantial
disagreements about the nature or magnitude of
the effect that any given policy may have; one
man’s triviality may be to another the end of
democracy as we know it. But at heart, these
disagreements boil down to a question of data.
Election advocates look to two basic kinds of data
to diagnose problems and identify opportunities.
The first is qualitative: descriptions of how a
jurisdiction operates and voter and administrator
experiences. Qualitative data helps advocates set
benchmarks and identify policy outliers, both
good and bad. 
Advocates also aim to establish a common
vocabulary. Federal elections are still extremely
decentralized; consequently people in different
states use different words to describe the same
thing and the same words to describe different
things. Whether a registration record is “pending”
or “suspended” or “inactive” or “provisional” might
have different consequences for a voter (or not),
leading to attention from advocates (or not). 
Qualitative data helps advocates understand
what they are looking at. 
The second and more familiar type of data is
quantitative. Here too, it helps set benchmarks
and identify outliers. It also helps assess the
magnitude of the impact of certain policies, and
the differential effect on various populations. The
more detailed the data, the better able advocates
are to identify issues and to determine the real
drivers of change.
There are pitfalls to diagnosing and responding
to problems based solely on readily available
data, however. Sometimes it’s a long way from
the available, measured item to the question that
truly demands an answer. Advocates must
constantly remind themselves of the possibility
that as-yet-unmeasured variables represent the
real cause of (or solution to) a particular issue,
and that the current state of the art in measured
data may be just sophisticated enough to be
distracting.
Priorities
Advocates will naturally turn to the issues that
yield the most bang for the buck. Data helps
separate bangs from whimpers.
With limited time and resources, they also face the
need to set priorities. Sometimes, priorities are
based on public opinion or individual anecdotes.
But they can also be driven by information of the
sort we are discussing here: qualitative data about
election practices, and quantitative data about the
impact of those practices on populations of
interest. 
Advocates are keenly aware that policymakers
have limited time and that elections are seldom
at the top of the list of pressing reforms. Even for
those policymakers with specific elections
responsibility, simply administering the status
quo is hardly simple. Reforms are usually greeted
— often appropriately — with a skeptical eye. 
Data is essential to persuading policymakers that
reform is necessary, or that a particular proposal
is more or less worthwhile. 
Publicity
Publicity is a critical tool for advocates, especially in
a crowded public policy environment. 
Most publicity efforts will feature an anecdotal
hook and a particular narrative frame. But any
advocate skilled in dealing with the media knows
that reporters will also demand data, particularly
quantitative data. New media outlets — blogs,
online publications, and email lists — provide ripe
opportunities for disseminating quantitative
results because they are less constrained for
space. Reporters routinely ask for numbers and
statistics demonstrating how many people are
affected; whether some populations are affected
more than others; and how many states or
counties experience the issue. 
Courts
Given the time, expense and uncertainty of
litigation, a lawsuit is almost always an advocate’s
last resort. In exceptional circumstances, however,
she may turn to the courts for policy reform on
discrete issues, and in those cases, data is crucial
to her success. 
Indeed, advocates were given a stark reminder of
the importance of data in the Supreme Court’s
recent Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
case, confronting a challenge to Indiana’s photo
identification rule. 
The Court’s emphasis on specific facts — who
was affected by the voter ID rule and to what
degree — indicates that it is no longer possible
for any litigant to challenge election procedures
on constitutional grounds to question the
importance of reliable data. 
Funding
Finally, most advocacy efforts rely on fundraising
from an external constituency. And whether that
constituency consists of individuals at the end of
an email, or foundations with sophisticated
appraisal-and-review operations, all donors like to
know that they’re getting their money’s worth.
Quantitative data is certainly not the only metric
by which funders determine how to spend their
charitable dollars, but data undoubtedly
represents a valued piece of the development
portfolio.
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The Issue
For nearly all Americans, voting is a two-step
process that requires registration before casting a
ballot.25 Understanding who registers is, therefore,
important to understanding who votes, and
ultimately, the policies the American
representative government adopts. In addition to
creating a record of citizen engagement, voter
registration rolls provide information to election
administrators for allocating Election Day
resources and to political campaigns for
developing voter outreach strategies.
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)
requires states to implement “a single, uniform,
official, centralized, interactive, computerized
statewide voter registration list.”26 At a minimum,
these databases contain names and addresses to
direct a voter to his or her correct precinct,
though most capture more information. Nearly all
provide birthdates and some provide gender and
race as shown in the 50-state assessment (see
page 52). 
As Chris Mann noted, campaigns are increasingly
supplementing these databases with information
from consumer finance databases for “micro-
targeting” efforts. States often collect additional
election administration information, such as each
election a voter participated in, the voting
method (in-person, early in-person, absentee, or
provisional), the processing status of absentee
ballots (when a ballot is requested, sent, returned,
and counted), when a registration record has
been updated (e.g., for a change of address) and
the source of a voter registration (e.g., at a motor
vehicles office). 
Registration data provides opportunities to
investigate and improve many aspects of
America’s voting system, from understanding
voting patterns by minorities for Voting Rights
claims to meeting more effectively the absentee
voting needs of our overseas military. 
Current Practices
Some states have struggled to meet HAVA’s
statewide voter registration database mandate.
Some local election officials believe that their old
system works better than the new statewide one
that has been imposed upon them. Yet, further
database integration is necessary if state election
officials and their local counterparts will develop
a single system to manage voter registration,
report election returns, track absentee and
provisional ballots, and produce reports on
voting technology. Integrated systems provide
new opportunities to evaluate performance.
Jurisdictions benefit from lowered election
administrative costs by using statewide databases
to identify and purge registered voters who move
between jurisdictions within a state. Statewide
voter registration databases could enable cross-
checking of registrations between states, too, a
project a consortium of Midwestern states started
undertaking in 2005.
Voter Registration Databases
Michael McDonald, George Mason University
Other innovations continue. Throughout Arizona
and in most Washington counties, voters can
register entirely online, which could help reduce
data entry errors and streamline the process.
Washington is also digitizing registration
application signatures as a means to
electronically verify the identity of those voting
by absentee ballot. A number of jurisdictions are
experimenting with automatic change of address
updating and eligibility verification by matching
registration and other databases, such as U.S. post
office change of address and corrections’ lists of
incarcerated felons.
Challenges
Perhaps the greatest challenge of working with
this data arises from the historical legacy of
administering elections at the local level. Prior to
modern computing technology, local election
officials maintained lists of registered voters by
pen and paper. These lists were unlikely to be in a
single format across a state. Although states must
now maintain a statewide electronic database,
local election officials continue to be the primary
point of contact for registration applications. In
some states, election administration data such as
voting history may be available only from
localities. Registration records — particularly
older legacy records — may contain errors from
carelessly completed applications, poor or
misinterpreted handwriting, or data keying errors.
Migration of voter registration records into
centralized vertical databases raises
interoperability issues between locality and 
state software, particularly when states join
regional or national compacts to track and 
audit registration rolls. 
Software solutions are usually fashioned for
specific applications and a common solution
among all states remains elusive. The
decentralized approach, lack of standardized file
formatting, and inconsistent availability of data
items continually challenge those who work with
multi-state databases. The absence of common
definitions among states further complicates
efforts. Some states identify voters who have
voted in a recent election as ‘active,’ and all others
as ‘inactive.’ Other states use dissimilar terms, and
it is unclear if states that differentiate use
consistent definitions of active and inactive
voters. Whether or not a state differentiates
between these voters can produce misleading
comparisons of the size of registration rolls and
turnout rates across jurisdictions.
Common spelling variations can affect proper
names and street addresses. Variations frequently
occur for people who have an apostrophe or other
punctuation in their name or have a common
name variant, such as “Steven’” or “Stephen.” Data
entry errors would be the most likely explanation
for birthdates that are correct only for visitors from
the future or persons having lived for over 200
years. These seemingly minor mistakes multiply
when dealing with millions of records. The lack of
an exact match between voter registration and
drivers’ license databases, for example, can result in
the denial of a right to vote. While it may seem
unlikely for two people to share the same name
and birth date, such false matches occur with
surprising frequency. Incorrect matches with
felons, for example, have led some to falsely
overstate levels of double voting.
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Recommendations
● The U.S. Election Assistance Commission or a
comparable organization needs to develop a
common data format for all state-level election
data, including voter registration files.
Vocabulary needs to be standardized and
universally adopted so that meaningful
between-state comparisons can be made. 
● Database integration safeguards must be
developed to protect eligible voters from
being dropped due to a false positive or false
negative match with another database. 
● As states continue experimenting with
innovative policies such as on-line registration
— which will hopefully reduce data entry
errors — they should build database systems
that capture as much information as possible,
and thus assess the efficacy of these new
policies. Public access to registration source
data — which is restricted by the 1993
National Voter Registration Act — should be
granted to responsible researchers and policy
advocates. This would permit studies to
increase transparency, improve election
administration and encourage confidence in
the electoral system.
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Seemingly innocent errors in voter registration
files, such as common name spelling
variations, street addresses without apartment
numbers or incomplete and improperly
formatted zip codes multiply quickly when
processing millions of records.
These errors became part of the debate over
the 2008 Florida primary when the state
Democratic Party proposed a “re-do” of the
primary using a vote-by-mail system.
My analysis of the Florida statewide voter
registration file shows that African Americans
are more frequently affected by easily
detectable address errors on the Florida voter
registration file. This calls into serious question
the legality of a full by-mail election in Florida
unless these errors are rectified.
Among the information recorded on the
Florida voter registration file is a registered
voter’s race. The overall statistics are: 
● Total number of records on the Florida voter
registration file: 11,428,946 
● Total number of African Americans:
1,353,272 
● Percentage of African Americans: 11.8 
Missing Apartment Numbers
The first problem I discovered in the Florida file
is that a large number of addresses fail to
include an apartment number, even though
the record is apparently at an apartment
building. Because African Americans are
disproportionately likely to rent, they are also
disproportionately affected by this error:
● Total number of potential records lacking an
apartment number: 189,186 
● Total number of African Americans: 36,193 
● Percentage of African Americans: 19.1 
Missing and Erroneous Zip Codes
A second easily detectable error on the Florida
voter registration file is missing or obviously
erroneous zip codes. These errors are far less
frequent statewide, but once again
disproportionately affect African Americans. 
● Total number of records with missing or
erroneous zip codes: 1,708 
● Total number of African Americans: 432 
● Percentage of African Americans: 25.3 
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The Issue
Unlike most democracies, the United States has
long placed the burden of voter registration on
the individual citizen. The National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), also known as
“Motor Voter,” sought to streamline the process by
intertwining the registration process with other
state-citizen interactions, including obtaining or
renewing driver’s licenses and dealings with
public service agencies. Lawmakers envisioned
the NVRA increasing the number of registered
voters and simultaneously broadening the
electorate with lower-income citizens who were
(and remain) drastically underrepresented in the
electorate. 
While the states subject to the NVRA were
required to implement the law at the beginning
Data for Democracy | Pew Center on the States26
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Data Collection and the National
Voter Registration Act 
Michael J. Hanmer, University of Maryland28
Project Vote, a nonprofit organization that
promotes voting in low-income and minority
communities, has been at the forefront of
attempts to evaluate the NVRA, particularly its
public assistance agency registration
provisions. The table on page 27, reproduced
from a 2008 Project Vote report, shows the
dramatic decline in public assistance agency-
based registration, suggesting failed or
inconsistent implementation of this aspect of
the NVRA.29 The report also notes that many
states do not comply with reporting
requirements — and that the U.S. Department
of Justice fails to remedy noncompliance.
Important information was gleaned from
existing data sources, but a full evaluation was
not possible because of varied reporting
practices in the states, their agencies and local
jurisdictions. 
Motor vehicle agencies have also been called
into question for their handling of NVRA
requirements. In 2008, 13 years after the
implementation date for NVRA — and after
complaints and Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) evidence30 — the New
Jersey Department of the Public Advocate
conducted an investigation. It reported that
only 8 percent of surveyed state residents who
completed motor vehicle transactions were
offered an opportunity to complete a voter
registration form. A paper by a recent arrival to
New Jersey cites the report and notes that “a
new resident with a valid out-of-state driver’s
license can pay $10 at the Department of
Motor Vehicles to ‘skip all that.’  ‘All that’
includes both the driver’s examination on New
Jersey law and the voter registration form.”31
R E G I S T R AT I O N S  AT  P U B L I C  A S S I S TA N C E  AG E N C I E S  D R O P
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of 1995, NVRA encountered resistance from state
officials and others.32 Some charged that it was
rigged to benefit Democrats. Others thought the
law would bloat rolls with inactive voters and
increase election fraud. And finally, some worried
that the law would put voter registration in the
hands of agencies that have neither the
equipment nor experience to handle and transfer
forms.33
Despite strict enforcement language in the
legislation, there is mounting evidence of lax
implementation of the NVRA in some states.34
Given the decentralized nature of election
administration — with vast authority granted to
states and local jurisdictions — there is little
standardization of data collection and minimal
evaluation of the NVRA provisions. 
Current Practices
Data on NVRA registration transactions comes
from two primary sources: the EAC and the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS):
Voter Supplement File. The CPS provides
representative samples from each state.
Information reported to the EAC varies widely
(shown in the 50-state comparison at the end of
this compendium), as do the NVRA-mandated
procedures for removing registrants from the
rolls. The Voter Supplement File of the CPS asks: 1)
if the respondent registered before or after
implementation of the NVRA; and, 2) the method
of registration. That information can be combined
with CPS voter participation data to calculate the
turnout rate among registrants in various
categories.35 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
collect information on NVRA transactions from
other sources, such as individual states or
localities.
REGISTRATIONS FROM PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AGENCIES BY ELECTION CYCLE
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Challenges 
Election administrators perform a complex set of
tasks with limited resources. The NVRA brought
voter registration into areas and agencies that
have different missions; they must strike a
balance between fulfilling new roles and their
core duties. The decentralized structure of
election administration further complicates
matters because every state — and sometimes
every county and city — functions differently. 
The EAC survey seeks to provide information
crucial to the evaluation of the NVRA overall as
well as in individual states. Yet, requests for
information have not been accompanied by
sufficient suggestions, guidance or support to
facilitate its collection. 
Moreover, even with detailed coding systems, the
volume of transactions can overwhelm election
officials’ ability to record details about matters as
simple as the origination of registration (e.g.
motor vehicle office, public assistance agency,
etc). The Census/CPS questions voters about the
timing and method of registration years
afterward.36
Recommendations 
● Develop standard definitions for all aspects of
voter registration.
● Establish a system for local election officials to
record information about the timing and
method of registration. Provide training and
integrate the system with a statewide database
to allow for real-time updating.
● Investigate states that fail to report or provide
incomplete or suspicious information to the
EAC.
● Record information on all transactions,
including those that do not result in a valid
registration and the reasons for the failure. 
Voting Technology and Data
Collection
Paul Herrnson, University of Maryland; Tammy Patrick, Maricopa County, Arizona, Board of Elections;
Pamela Smith, Verified Voting Foundation 
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The Issue
Voting technology and ballot design affect voters’
experiences and the integrity of the electoral
system in significant ways. Researchers are gaining
a better understanding of the forces at play.
Aggregate measures — the residual vote, for
example — provide a general sense of how often
voting system and ballot design lead to voter
errors.37 Usability research — including an
examination of voters’ confidence in the system,
their need for help when voting and likely errors
— lends further insight to the issue.38 However,
this remains a relatively new field. 
New voting systems are being introduced,
existing systems are being refined and ballots are
being improved. Innovative approaches to
studying voting systems and ballots are also
underway. Nevertheless, data collection efforts
and reporting methods would benefit from
greater uniformity. The federal government is
developing Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines,
a set of standards that could aid data collection
efforts. 
Voting Technology and Data 
Collection Case Study
Since the passage of the Help America Vote Act
in 2002, most jurisdictions have modified their
voting system technology, administrative
procedures or both. Implementing such
sweeping change requires months of preparation
and planning as well as a post-election
evaluation. 
Maricopa County, Ariz., created a reporting
system to track and analyze categorized
information from a variety of sources. The new
system enables the jurisdiction to review voting
machine performance, supply or distribution
problems and poll worker effectiveness. It also
helps the county identify best practices for future
elections. An analysis found that hand-held
electronic devices or electronic poll books for poll
workers could provide at least two benefits: 1)
access to information, such as county-wide
registration lists and polling place locations,
necessary for answering frequently asked
questions, and 2) records of the accessed
information. (See page 7 for more details.)
Both could, in turn, yield valuable data on turnout
trends, the number of voters who cast their
ballots at their correct precinct polling location,
as well as the number of voters who arrive at the
wrong precinct. The technology could also assess
the effectiveness of administrative changes and
equipment performance. Such opportunities for
applying technology in elections are only
beginning to be explored. 
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Current Practices
Data collection has been uneven in some parts of
the country and almost nonexistent in others. Few
states, for example, report vote totals for each
machine and some do not even keep records of
the technology they use. Inconsistent collection
practices require researchers to look to the county
or local levels for this information. Many states do
not systematically maintain records of ballots and
of machine malfunctions originating from
hardware, software or human error. 
All voting systems, associated auxiliary equipment
and administrative procedures should be regularly
evaluated in the context of the entire process to
assess security vulnerabilities. Direct comparisons
of the security of voting systems — including
direct-electronic recording machine and paper-
based ones — should be conducted. 
Analyses of electronic poll books and other new
technologies should be undertaken as well.
Finally, end-to-end studies beginning with the
design of ballots and concluding with the
certification of an election are needed.
Challenges 
Problems continue with the usability, security and
ballot design of both electronic and paper ballot
systems. The sparsely populated voting industry
faces pressure to make its source codes public,
and must meet certification requirements when
making even minor modifications to products.
New voting machines often require additional
recruitment and training of poll workers. The
increasing use of central-count paper-ballot
systems raises the likelihood of additional errors
and a variety of issues related to data collection
remains. 
Recommendations 
● Conduct additional research on the impact of
specific system and ballot features on the
voting experience. Collect and analyze data to
assess the impact of various voting systems
and other relevant technology on post-
election audits
● Immediately report incidences of voter
intimidation, polling place distribution of
misleading information and other
questionable practices to a “hotline” or
responsive authority.
● Search for a consensus among election
officials, security experts, advocates and
vendors about what constitutes usability and
election security, the relevant data for
measuring them and the systematic
comparative studies to conduct.
● Encourage comprehensive, end-to-end studies
of the voting process, from programming
ballots to auditing election results. 
The 2008 presidential preference primary
election in Los Angeles County showcased the
consequences of poor ballot
design. It also underscored
that data collection and
analysis can help solve
election problems.
As shown in the
accompanying images, the
optical-scan ballot design
required voters without
partisan affiliations who
wished to vote in either
the Democratic Party or
American Independent
Party primary to mark an
extra “bubble” on their
ballots to designate their
party choice as well as
the corresponding
“bubble” to vote for a
presidential nominee.
Voters who failed to
mark the extra bubble
unknowingly invalidated
their selection for president. Upon learning of
the problem, I issued a statement committing
to “conduct a thorough review of the
nonpartisan ballots cast and to identify the
extent to which potential voter
disenfranchisement may have occurred in
relation to ballot layout.”39
Although the scope of the problem was
undetermined, initial media reports estimated
nearly 100,000 ballots out of an estimated 2.2
million cast were not counted. The Los Angeles
Country Registrar-Recorder (LACRR) took a
random sample of its 1
percent manual tally and
determined that there were
approximately 50,000
erroneous ballots. While still
unacceptable, the estimate
established a baseline for
constructing a solution to
narrow the number of
invalidated votes to
12,000.
As I testified before the
California Senate Select
Committee on Integrity
of Elections, the LACRR
convened a working
group of community
stakeholders to study the
existing ballot and
produce a revised design
and instructions to
satisfy usability, legal and
administrative
requirements.40 The findings formed the
foundation for a new ballot that was
implemented in the June primary election. 
The situation revealed that election
administrators often possess the tools to
analytically examine and correct voter and
administrative issues. Properly used, the tools
can mine the data to identify possible
solutions and inform decisions. 
LO S  A N G E L E S  CO U N T Y ’ S  “ D O U B L E  B U B B L E ” :  
H O W  DATA  A N D  T R A N S PA R E N C Y  C A N  AV O I D  P R O B L E M S
Dean C. Logan, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk
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The Issue 
Election result summaries — which include
information about turnout as well as votes for
measures, candidates and parties — are generally
reported at the precinct level. Numerous groups
use these data for a variety of purposes.
Advocacy groups and service providers, for
example, use them to gauge the political
temperament of the electorate and to lobby
elected officials. Watchdog organizations
reference the data for assessing compliance with
the Voting Rights Act and employ them for
redistricting jurisdictions. 
Correlated to a wide range of issues — including
ballot design and voting technology — the
results can illuminate successes, failures and
challenges. Turnout information, for example,
helps determine voter participation rates and
provides local election officials with a tool for
accountability. Although data can draw attention
to problems, it is important to keep in mind that
they do not independently explain causes. 
Current Practices 
Thousands of local jurisdictions collect election
results. Most states have a great deal of
autonomy and independently decide what to
collect and report. However, the data — which
lack uniformity in reporting, quality and reliability
— are inconsistently reported to state and federal
authorities. Most local election offices use
management systems with the capacity to
produce reports and thus satisfy the majority of
requests (assuming they are asked for in advance
and programmed by the vendor). Nonetheless,
administrative practices in some jurisdictions do
not lend themselves to data collection. A request
to them to track and identify the reasons for
spoiled ballots, for example, would therefore
require additional staff. 
Election Results
Karin Mac Donald, University of California-Berkeley
Election results played a critical role in
identifying voting discrepancies in the 13th
Congressional District election in Florida,
2006. In a close race, Sarasota County, one
of the four main counties that comprise the
13th Congressional District, had an
unusually large residual vote — 18,000
ballots showed that no votes were cast for a
race that fewer than 400 votes decided. The
initial focus of the investigation was voting
machine error; the second was ballot layout;
and, the third was the hypothesis that a
negative and bitter campaign led voters to
avoid the race.41 A February 2008 GAO
report relayed researchers’ findings that
“significantly reduced the possibility” that
the machines were responsible. Rather, it
concluded that a combination of poor
ballot design and weak voter participation
in the race in question likely accounted for
the discrepancy.42
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Challenges 
Local election officials (LEOs) have little incentive
to cooperate with unfunded data requests, which
often involve extra work and expense for
understaffed and underfunded offices. In
addition, the data may be used to criticize or, in
some cases, even sue them. Non-compliance, on
the other hand, results in infrequent and
relatively minor negative repercussions that are
rarely more than embarrassing
Requests for data which are even slightly dissimilar
to previous ones can require time-consuming
work. Collaborative collection efforts among state
and federal agencies are infrequent, and the
absence of uniform terminology in local
jurisdictions further complicates efforts. Are
absentee votes, for example, provided with
precinct results, or, are they allocated to non-
geographic “mail ballot” precincts? Inconsistent,
incorrectly produced, and often unavailable data
have compromised the reliability of national
surveys. 
Recommendations 
● Structure surveys so LEOs can use the results
to assess their procedures. 
● Include LEOs in the planning of data requests,
and provide them sufficient notice to make
changes to their election management
systems. 
● Define the reporting mode of each indicator
and strive for intra-state consistency among
jurisdictions.
● Leave poll workers to focus on their already
complex job duties rather than data collection
efforts. 
● Have LEOs track spoiled ballots locally for
accountability purposes. 
● Distinguish between early- and Election-Day
voting in national surveys. 
● Supplement election results with qualitative
information such as a description of the
administrative environment and an overview
of the processes and procedures. 
● Increase data sharing and language uniformity
among agencies to reduce the demands of
multiple, similar requests on LEOs.
● Implement shorter, high-quality national
surveys and supplement them with in-depth
studies with a sample of states.
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The Issue
Over the last decade, alternative methods of
balloting have become increasingly popular
among voters, election officials and campaigns.
“Convenience voting,” the umbrella term for
absentee, early in-person, vote-by-mail and 
other alternatives to traditional election-day
precinct voting, has the potential to be either a
gold mine or a land mine for every group
concerned with elections. 
While election officials might have to manage 
two separate voting systems, they can ease the
strain on polling places on Election Day when
voters choose to cast ballots early. 
While campaigns must maintain maximum
intensity for a longer period — Election Day is
extended over a period of weeks or even months
— resources can be more effectively targeted
toward undecided voters and get-out-the-vote
efforts, banking those who have already cast 
their ballots. 
And voters, while required to make up their
minds earlier if they choose convenience 
voting, can skip the lines, parking hassles and
other inconveniences associated with Election-
Day voting. 
For those charged with running elections, 
there are compelling reasons to consider
convenience voting as a tool for more effective
election administration. In order to evaluate the
benefits or drawbacks of convenience voting,
however, it is essential to have high-quality
uniform data. 
Current Practices 
Alternative modes of voting have rapidly gained
popularity. More than a quarter of the American
electorate cast ballots outside of traditional
voting precincts in 2006. Election data, however,
has not kept pace. Some states can track the
method by which a citizen casts the ballot, the
machine on which the ballot was cast or counted
(since jurisdictions may use different machinery
for absentee, early in-person, and precinct place
voting), and even the date that the absentee
ballot was returned to the local office or the in-
person early vote was cast. In some cases,
campaigns and get-out- the-vote organizations
can access this information in real-time during
the campaign, allowing them to target their
mobilization efforts (as noted by Chris Mann in
his essay). 
But not all states have not kept up with the 
pace of change. In many, real-time information is
available only at the county level and can be
needlessly expensive. Some states don’t 
separate non-precinct place votes from precinct
place votes. In Florida, state law requires 
election officials to keep no-excuse absentee
votes confidential while making in-person early
voting records readily available on the Web. This
is a case where state law has tied the hands of
elections officials.
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Convenience Voting
Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Early Voting Information Center, Reed College
Terms and Rules: The terms and rules that states
apply to the same or only slightly different
administrative practices vary widely. “Vote-by-
mail,” for example, describes Oregon’s system of
all-mail elections for all registered voters or an
opt-in system, such as that employed California
and Colorado, where voters can elect to receive
absentee ballots on a permanent basis. Similarly,
“in-person early voting,” “one-stop absentee
voting,” and “in-person absentee voting” all share
some characteristics — voters cast ballots at
election offices or central polling locations rather
than traditional precincts — but the rules and
terms are swapped and combined in a
seemingly-infinite array of particular situations. 
Reporting Mode: While a growing number of
states report their election statistics by mode of
voting (traditional polling place, absentee, early
in-person, etc.), most still do not. Separating
early/absentee voting statistics from election-day
balloting is essential to analyze the impact on the
election system.
Challenges
Evaluating Cost: Some states, including Oregon
and Washington, have reported significant cost
savings when administering the vote by mail
rather than at precincts. With limited data on the
cost of elections, it is difficult to evaluate these
claims. Others suggest that the costs are actually
higher when a jurisdiction must run a “hybrid”
election system — that is, one with both
traditional election day polling places and one or
more methods of convenience voting — because
of additional staffing and equipment needs. How
can election costs be evaluated, and how much
are we willing to pay for convenience?
Ballot Security: Many critics of convenience
voting — especially of no-excuse absentee
balloting and vote-by-mail — suggest that 
ballot security is compromised between the 
time that the ballot leaves the election office 
and the time it returns. The potential for fraud,
tampering, stolen ballots and undue influence 
on voters are all reasons for caution, but how
significant is the risk?
Voter Error and Regret: Absentee ballots, like 
all paper ballots, hold the potential for voters to
skip races mistakenly or overvote. Unlike polling-
place voters, absentee voters do not have the
chance to correct a ballot once it has been
dropped in the mailbox. Similarly, any voter who
votes before Election Day might encounter
information to change his or her mind after the
ballot has been cast. Studies analyzing voting
systems have indicated that centrally counted
optical-scan ballots, the system most frequently
used for absentee voting, leads to more
uncounted votes than many other systems.43 A
study of vote rates conducted by David Kimball
of the University of Missouri St. Louis indicated
centrally counted optical-scan ballots had a
residual (ballots cast that failed to record a valid
vote for president) rate of 1.8 percent in 2004, a
figure twice as high as that for precinct-based
optically scanned ballots.44
Recommendations 
● States should assess the cost of elections by
voting method. The cost per voter of each 
type of voting, including polling place
precinct, in-person early, by-mail absentee, 
and other convenience methods should be
determined. 
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● Working with the EAC and their own professional
organizations, such as the National Association of
Secretaries of State and the National Association
of State Election Directors, states and local
jurisdictions should strive to adopt a uniform set
of terms describing convenience voting
practices. Where possible, they should adhere to
a common set of guidelines and rules.
● All states should report turnout statistics by
mode of balloting.
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
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Four years after the implementation of Georgia’s advance/early voting, interest continues to be
high and there is demand from voters for longer hours, more days, and additional locations. 
The Forsyth County Elections Office collects data on how many voters cast their ballots at various
early voting locations as well as where these voters live. This data is invaluable in managing early
voting, by helping us meet voter demand while simultaneously attending to budgetary and
staffing constraints. 
Using Advance Voting Statistics to Manage Staffing
Data from our Early Voting sites is collected on a dynamic basis, enabling us to increase or
decrease the number of poll workers present on an as-needed basis. This is important for counties
that have limited or reduced budgets and need to ensure that their funds are spent judiciously.
Additionally, it decreases the pressure on the precinct during Election Day and increases the
positive experience that a voter has as a result of reduced wait time. 
For instance, in the 2008 presidential preference primary, we tracked daily turnout at five advance
voting sites. This data was used to help us allocate additional poll workers and other staff to the
sites with increasing turnout. In the three sites with unusually low turnout, we reviewed our
policies and procedures to see if there were ways to increase turnout in those areas. 
USING DATA TO INCREASE EFFEC TIVENESS AND DECREASE COST OF
ADVANCE/EARLY VOTING SITES IN FORSY TH COUNT Y GEORGIA
Gary Smith, Chairman, Board of Registrations and Elections, Forsyth County
ADVANCE VOTING STATISTICS FOR THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY
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Geographic Information Systems and Early Voting
To better understand the geography of early voting, Forsyth County uses geographic information
systems (GIS) to evaluate the placement of our early voting stations. GIS data allows us to track
where early voters live and how far they are willing to travel to vote. The maps below plot the
residential location of early voters for each early voting station. We have learned that some sites
draw voters from across the county while others appeal to those living nearby.
Site 1 is located in the central part of our county at the Central Library. It was one of our first early
voting sites. While, as expected, this site drew voters from across the county, we were not expecting
the large number of elderly voters at this location coming from a senior center located adjacent to
the library. These data allowed us to adjust and provide sufficient accommodations for voters with
limited mobility.
Site 2 is located in the County Administration Building. As expected, voters come to this location
from across the county, reflecting all the reasons that people come to this building — to pay
water bills, check with tax assessor, get building permits etc. This site will always have a good
turnout but we have faced challenges in making certain that we have sufficient parking. 
We have conducted parallel analyses in our other three early voting sites. In two sites, we realized
that a location off of a main highway was not sufficiently visible to commuters, and we were able to
increase turnout by adding signage and in one case, adding information to a regular county mailing.
In the third location, in a public library, voters are drawn predominantly from nearby locales.
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The Issue
Fail-safe voting — which allows those not on
registration rolls to cast ballots and have their
eligibility established later — existed in many
states before the 2000 election. All but 13 states
provided some recourse to voters who went to
the polls on Election Day believing they were
registered, but whose names did not appear on
the rolls.45
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), passed in
2002, mandates the use of provisional ballots
nationwide. According to Section 302 of the Act,
any individual who declares herself a registered
voter in her jurisdiction can cast a provisional
ballot, that is then segregated from regular
ballots and counted upon verification of
eligibility. It also states that the voter can confirm
that the ballot was counted, or the reason it was
not tallied.46
This relatively new method of provisional voting
is badly measured and poorly understood. 
The mandate is applied in varying degrees across
states and localities; some, for instance, require
the voter be in her correct precinct to cast a
provisional ballot, while others allow anyone
within a jurisdiction to do so. 
The extent to which the federal mandate is
achieving the hoped-for objectives — as well as
the degree to which jurisdictions are complying
— is unknown. U.S. Election Assistance
Committee (EAC) surveys conducted in both
2004 and 2006 reveal considerable variation in
the rates of casting, counting and rejecting
provisional ballots.
The lack of reliable measurement carries
troubling legal and political implications.
Moreover, lacking such measurement, there is
little to do but speculate about the causes of 
the variations. 
Current Practices
More and better data is essential for two reasons. 
First, information on the procedures that local
election boards undertake in determining
whether or not to count a provisional ballot is
usually unreliable. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that counties
exercise varying degrees of effort to determine a
provisional voter’s registration status, which could
be the primary reason for differing rejection rates.
Does a county, for example, merely consult a
computerized database? Or does it go further,
and check voter registration cards and other state
agencies (like the DMV) for inaccuracies and
systemic delays?
Election Data and Provisional
Voting
Edward Foley, Moritz School of Law, Ohio State University
Data for Democracy | Pew Center on the States40
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
41
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
Improving Elections Through Metrics and Measurement
Provisional voting exists precisely for those
circumstances in which the voter thinks that he
or she is registered, while the poll worker thinks
the opposite is true.
Unfortunately, in most circumstances we rarely
know whether the provisional ballot was
counted, or was not. And we know virtually
nothing about how the local board made that
determination; the steps it took and the amount
of time it deliberated are a mystery. We also do
not know about the voter’s effort (if any) to
confirm her registration after the election. 
Second, improved data is necessary to explain
the wide variation in acceptance rates. Are the
differences due to administrative practices or to
citizens’ failure to register? 
Ohio (see box above) illustrates the need for
better provisional voting data. 
The different treatment of similarly situated provisional voters raises serious questions about the
fairness of the electoral process. 
For example, in many jurisdictions, the primary reason for rejecting a provisional ballot is that the
voter is “not registered.” Yet, pursuant to HAVA, each voter must sign a statement that she believes
herself to be registered in order to receive a provisional ballot. 
The table below shows the percentages of provisional ballots that were rejected in the state’s six
largest urban counties because a voter was deemed to be not registered:
Lucas (Toledo) 11.24% Hamilton (Cincinnati) 6.24%
Cuyahoga (Cleveland) 8.05% Summit (Akron) 5.68%
Montgomery (Dayton) 7.95% Franklin (Columbus) 3.37%
While the variation in this table is striking, it tells only part of the story. In 10 percent of precincts
within Cuyahoga, at least one quarter of provisional ballots were rejected for being “not
registered.” In more than 40 percent of the precincts, however, none of the provisional ballots were
rejected for the same reason.
What explains these discrepancies, especially between extremes? Do voters in demographically
comparable jurisdictions vary so considerably in understanding their registration status? Do
dissimilar administrative practices contribute to the variation? Without more data and careful
analysis, one can only surmise.
P R O V I S I O N A L  B A L LOT S  I N  O H I O
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Provisional voting is an “insurance policy” for
citizens. When debating HAVA, Congress called it
“fail-safe voting.”47 Provisional policies are a means
of protecting voters against administrative errors
in the same way that title insurance safeguards
property owners from mistakes with deeds. 
We need to know how well — or how poorly —
provisional voting is living up to its promise and
purpose. When the subject is the equal right of
citizens to participate in democratic elections,
knowing the effectiveness of the mechanism is
vital. 
Challenges
The primary challenges to collecting and
reporting valid data on the use of provisional
ballots are the same challenges that have been
reiterated throughout this compendium: fifty
separate and sometimes conflicting legal
regimes, inconsistent application of state laws by
local officials, irregular collection of data, and
disagreements on basic definitions and
categories. While changes in election
administration over the past six years have
dramatically improved the ability of voters to cast
a “fail-safe” ballot when their registration is
challenged, there has been no similar
improvement in how local jurisdictions and states
report this information. This makes it nearly
impossible to monitor how well provisional
ballots are working as a true fail safe, or whether
they are just a paper tiger.
Recommendations 
● Report the number of provisional ballots
requested, accepted, and rejected as well as
the reasons for rejection, for all precincts in
each state. In order to reassure the public that
access to the ballot was as full and fair as
possible, this data needs to be released as
soon as possible after an election, ideally
within a week. Waiting until the EAC survey is
administered is too late.
● Where possible, develop common, cross-state
standards for administering provisional ballots,
possibly coordinating with the EAC.
● Recognize that the emergence of new voting
systems, such as early in-person voting and
voting centers, may affect the use of
provisional ballots. Develop standards for the
use of provisional ballots in out-of-precinct
situations.
This compendium represents just the first step on
the road toward the use of better data in making
decisions about election administration. The
conference that inspired it revealed a number of
important insights about how exciting—and yet
how difficult—this process will be. Comments
made during this conference fell into two broad
categories: those suggesting that the push for
data is inevitable, and those who worry about the
obstacles. So a key questions remains: What
happens when an irresistible force meets an
immovable object?
Data-driven policy making: an
irresistible force?
The idea that data for democracy is inevitable is
based on several key observations:
1. Good data leads to better management.
Good data is a crucial component of good
management. Election administrators offer
numerous examples of ways that data allows
them to make real-time corrections on Election
Day and set better long-term policy, and some of
these are represented in this volume. Good data
helps election administrators allocate resources,
monitor performance and identify best practices. 
Just as significantly, bad data makes for bad
choices and policy.
Information provides a context for any decision.
Without good data, it is hard to tell what is being
done right, let alone figure out ways to improve.
Without good data, it is impossible to distinguish
between a glitch and a trend. Just think about
the way economic policy used to work. During
the 19th century, economic downturns were
called “panics” precisely because no one could tell
the difference between an economic blip and a
troubling trend. Because we now possess reliable
economic data, economists can tell us when we
have entered a recession—a pronouncement
that triggers a series of policy correctives. 
2. Data is a sword and a shield.
Election administrators often worry that data will
be used against them by reformers and the like.
As one participant admitted, “no one wants to
look stupid.” But we have also found that good
data can serve as a sword and a shield for
election administrators. 
First, comparative data can serve as a sword by
enabling election administrators to make the
case for the resources they need. Data helps
them identify precisely the problems they wish to
address while providing comparative information
about resources. Both are essential in order to
convince an elected official that additional
funding is necessary. 
Second, in today’s highly partisan environment,
data provides election administrators with a
shield against unfounded accusations. Good data
can reassure advocacy groups that a problem is
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Conclusion—The (Winding) Road
Ahead
Heather Gerken, Yale Law School
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not serious and/or that it is being addressed.
Moreover, good data can put to rest the rumors
and unfounded speculation that too often arise
from haphazard reporting and minor glitches. 
Because voters—and the media—learn about
problems only when there is a crisis, they lack a
comparative baseline for assessing what’s going
on—and can be quick to leap to the conclusion
that the problem was deliberately engineered.
After all, most voters operate in a virtual black
box. They know there’s a crisis; they don’t see
other places experiencing the same problem;
and, they may even be aware of the partisan
affiliation of the person in charge. It is all too easy
to connect the dots. Providing valid and reliable
data helps ensure that the information vacuum
doesn’t lead the media and the public to the
wrong conclusions. 
As L.A. County’s recent “double bubble trouble”
has shown (see page 31), transparency about the
problem and its source can be extremely
effective in shutting down a partisan maelstrom. 
3. Data-driven policy making is the wave of the
future.
Conference participants also made clear that
data-driven policy making is the wave of the
future and thus assumed that election
administration will be swept up in this broader
trend. Data is the lifeblood of business. Walmart,
for instance, has such a refined data-collection
system that when a hurricane approaches, it
knows to stock local stores not just with
flashlights and back-up generators, but with
strawberry Pop Tarts (which data says people buy
before hurricanes). 
It’s not just private businesses that depend on
data to drive policy. Government agencies across
the country use programs like Citistat to manage
problems and set policies. Witness the
remarkable work done in places like New York
City and Baltimore using data-driven analysis.
4. If we don’t generate the data, someone else
will.
Another argument heard during this conference
was that if election administrators and experts
don’t create data, someone else will, without the
necessary rigor. Now that election administration
has become a salient public issue, people are
hungry for a baseline—some means for assessing
how well their election system is performing. 
Barriers to collecting good data—
an immovable object?
Of course, if the notion of data for democracy
were easy, it would already exist. Several very real
obstacles currently prevent the collection of
good data. These obstacles are so formidable that
they seem like immovable objects.
1. Resources, resources, resources
Good data collection will require more resources.
Election administrators—particularly those in
small jurisdictions and rural areas—are already
doing too much with too little. The absence of
sufficient resources poses an important hurdle for
those who want better elections data.
2. Infrastructure
The absence of a data infrastructure makes good
data collection quite difficult. In some states, data
would have to be collected by hundreds of local
jurisdictions. At present, there is no agreement on
the proper definition of basic terms, which makes
it impossible to compare data across jurisdictions.
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Even if agreement existed, the software used by
jurisdictions (even within the same jurisdictions)
is utterly incompatible, making collective “data
dumps” virtually impossible. 
3. The private worries of election
administrators
Election administrators also harbor private
worries about the push for more data. Congress
has a tendency to pass unfunded mandates. As a
result, election administrators worry about being
saddled with another duty without being given
the resources they need to fulfill it. 
Scholars currently play an important role in
generating what little data exists. But they have
no incentive to coordinate their efforts (which
means some election administrators are flooded
with requests), and often don’t share the data
sets they generate. If election administrators were
to create more data, would this problem worsen?
Election administrators also worry about how
advocacy groups will use the data. Will they, for
example, sacrifice long-term credibility for short-
term publicity? Finally, local officials express
concern that imperfect data might lead to
unnecessary, even bad, reforms if not used wisely.
Data can play a powerful role in debates; the key
is to make sure that role is also productive.
4. Is the game worth the candle?
Finally, people in the immovable object camp
worry that the game may not be worth the
candle. The fear is that we will devote a lot of
resources to getting data only to discover that it
isn’t as reliable or useful as we had hoped.
What should be taken from this?
Collectively, the comments from the two sides of
the irresistible force/immovable object
conversation provide some useful lessons about
how to think about data for democracy going
forward.
1. Recognize the trade-offs
One obvious lesson is to acknowledge the costs
and trade-offs involved in collecting data. As
tempting as it may be to “collect it all,” that is an
unrealistic goal, at least in the short term. Instead,
resources should be targeted at what matters
most, keeping in mind precisely why we are
collecting the data.
At the Data for Democracy conference, Charles
Stewart of MIT suggested that “it is better to
measure a few things well than lots of things
badly.” Take the residual vote rate. It’s an elegant,
easy-to-understand metric for evaluating the
quality of one small but important part of the
voting process. 
Eric Fischer of the Congressional Research Service
offered another useful strategy for thinking about
the problem. He suggested careful consideration
of what data is needed at each level of
government: national, state and local. Data
collectors would make a choice akin to that made
by the U.S. Census Bureau in devising short and
long survey forms. Information desired from
everyone goes on the short form. Other
information will suffice as long as it’s drawn from
a large enough random sample. 
I have my own suggestion. Many federal
regulatory statutes exempt small businesses
because of the belief that some requirements are
just too onerous for them— instances where the
game is simply not worth it. Perhaps election
administrators should follow the same lesson and
exempt the smallest localities from the reporting
requirements we impose elsewhere.
2. Easing the burden on election officials
While there are surely election officials who will
prove recalcitrant about collecting and sharing
data, it is nonetheless clear that the reasons that
election officials give for not collecting good data
are quite real and quite serious. We should do
everything we can to ease those burdens.
Obvious steps include:
(a) Money, money, money
Data matters, but money does, too. We need to
be able to persuade local, state and federal
officials to invest in the election system. This, of
course, is why Congress’ recent decision to
allocate $10 million to fund model data collection
at the state level is so important. You can’t ask
Congress to fund data collection until you can
document how much you need.
(b) Capacity
We can take steps to increase capacity, giving
election officials the tools they need to collect
good data, whether it is software that prompts
local officials to collect the right information, pilot
programs, reports on useful case studies,
development of a set of best practices, or even
direct technical assistance to states and localities.
(c) Standardization
We need standard terms in order for the data we
collect to be meaningful. Throughout the
conference, inconsistencies and ambiguities were
discovered that the EAC, along with local officials,
can and should eliminate over time.
3. Align the incentives of local officials
The quality and quantity of data that is ultimately
collected will depend largely on the cooperation
of local officials. We need to align the incentives
of local officials with the interests of voters in
order to encourage them to collect the data that
everyone agrees we should have. Let me suggest
a few possible strategies for doing so:
(a) Establish a standing army of political scientists to
referee controversies over the data
Political scientists are always happy to have data.
Data leads to papers—the coin of the academic
realm. I suggest a quid pro quo. In exchange for
assistance from election administrators, political
scientists should agree to help sort out data
controversies that call the election system into
question. 
(b) Consolidate
There is a tragedy of the commons in the world
of election administration. Political scientists want
data, but sometimes they forget that many of
them are knocking at election administrators’
doors. Rather than everyone acting as a free
agent, perhaps political scientists should
coordinate and prioritize data requests as they do
with big, national surveys. Finally, political
scientists should share their data—not just the
underlying information, but the scripts and
widgets they use to process that data—so that
we can all reap the benefit of the work that
election administrators and political scientists
have done.
Data for Democracy | Pew Center on the States46
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
Improving Elections Through Metrics and Measurement 47
The good news
In closing, there are three grounds for optimism
about the future of data for democracy:
1. We are so far behind that curve that we’re
ahead of it.
Election administration is far behind the rest of
the country on the data-collection front. And yet
it can sometimes be useful to be behind the
curve. The position allows us to learn from others’
mistakes and take advantage of the many
advances in software and computer capacity.
Consider the African phone system. Many people
once believed it impossible for Africa to build the
phone lines it needed to modernize. And then
came the cell phone, which doesn’t require land
lines or complicated infrastructure. As a result,
Africa was able to make remarkable advances in
telecommunications without the costly interim
steps more advanced nations had made to arrive
in the same place.
2. We can talk to each other.
Rumors of discord are greatly exaggerated. It is
tempting to describe election officials, political
scientists and advocates as separate tribes, but
the conversation to date has made it clear that
areas of agreement predominate. These
conversations across professional tribes work and
should be continued.
3. Everyone has gone through this.
I am currently finishing a book on the concept of
data for democracy and the Democracy Index.
During that process, I did a lot of research on the
experience of other people who have assembled
data on topics ranging from educational quality
to international aid, from governmental
performance to environmental policy. Virtually
everyone with whom I spoke was convinced at
the outset that collecting the data would be
impossible. And still, they all succeeded. I’m
guessing we will, too.
Introduction
A vital part of the Data for Democracy initiative is
not just to show ways that data can improve
elections management, but also to assess states
on their current level of data reporting. This 50
state assessment provides this information.
The data that is reported in the following pages is
the first and, we hope, not the last word on the
performance of states in providing the vital
information necessary to evaluate, reform, and
improve elections performance in the United
States. The 50-state assessment puts some meat
on the bones of the discussions that animated
the Data for Democracy conference and the
essays that comprise this volume.
In addition, we purposely do not grade states on
the quality of their data reporting. The Data for
Democracy initiative is at too early a stage to rank
states based on this information, because the field
has not yet come to any consensus about what
constitutes essential and secondary data elements.
We let the data speak for itself. It is not our
intention to suggest, for example, that voter
registration files should be available at no cost, or
that a file that costs more than $1,000 is
expensive. 
There are many things that could have gone into
such a comparison, but in the interest of space,
are not included here. We do not, for example,
examine the accuracy of voter registration files, as
Professors Michael Hanmer and Michael
McDonald and campaign consultant Christopher
Mann argue for in the compendium. We have not
explored how easily election results are made
available on the Internet, as Karin Mac Donald
urges in her essay, nor do we list which states
report results by different methods of voting, as
Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum suggests. We leave these
tasks for future analysts and future reports. 
Instead, we focus on what most observers agree
are two central elements of state elections data
reporting: voter registration files, and responses
to the federally mandated Election
Administration and Election Day survey of the
Election Assistance Commission. 
The Costs and Accessibility of
Voter Registration Files
Voter registration is the first step in the voting
chain — the first entry point by which citizens
transform into voters. Statewide voter registration
files were a primary part of the reforms enshrined
in the Help America Voting Act (HAVA). Many of
the commentators at the Data for Democracy
conference, like a recent National Academy of
Sciences committee, argued for easily accessible,
inexpensive, and interoperable voter registration
files.48
A 50-State Assessment of Data
Availability and Data Reporting
Paul Gronke and Bailey Schreiber, Early Voting Information Center, Reed College
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In this section, we evaluate the information
contained in statewide voter registration files. In
order to collect this information, staff at the Pew
Center on the States and at the Early Voting
Information Center at Reed College contacted the
state elections office and requested information
on how end users are able to obtain statewide
voter registration and voter history files. In some
cases, we were directed to a form on the Web; in
other cases, forms were mailed or faxed to us. In
all cases, if necessary, we followed up to find out
in what format the data are disseminated and
what restrictions, if any, there were on data use.
As the table on page 52 shows, the information
available in these files varies substantially. The
good news is that all files are currently
disseminated in electronic formats that are easily
read by spreadsheeting and statistical programs.
All but four states include the data of registration,
and all but six include the date of birth.
Other data elements are less consistently
reported. Twelve states fail to separate inactive
from active voters in their files, rendering it very
difficult for a political campaign or a get out the
vote organization to efficiently target voters. Only
27 states report gender. Nine states report race /
ethnicity in their files, but these states do so
because the Voting Rights Act requires them to.
Similarly, not all states require voters to register
with a political party, so there is no reason to
expect that to be in the files (we have not
attempted to compare state laws with data
reporting).
The bad news concerns cost: there is tremendous
variation in what states charge for access to these
files. As shown in the attached figures, which
display the range and relative costs of voter
registration files, the bulk of states have
determined that voter registration files can be
provided for a nominal fee, less than $100. Five
states charge nothing at all for the files. Yet, more
than one-quarter of the states charge at least
$1000 for these files. Three states charge over
$10,000. 
COSTS OF STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION FILES
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Free Less than
$100
Between
$100 and
$250
Between
$300 and
$500
$1,000 to
$3,000
$4,000 to
$7,000
$10,000 to
$30,000
N
um
be
r o
f s
ta
te
s
Improving Elections Through Metrics and Measurement
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
49
R E A L- W O R L D  DATA
50 Data for Democracy | Pew Center on the States
We don’t know what the ideal cost of a voter
registration file is. A file that is too inexpensive
may be requested too often; a small fee to
recover costs may not seem unreasonable. We
also do not show how the policy decision has
been made to set these costs. But to have such a
disparity across states does seem unreasonable.
There is no apparent pattern to these costs — it
is not as if larger states, or states with more
election jurisdictions, charge more. 
INDIVIDUAL STATE FEES FOR STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION FILES
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Alabama
Arizona
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Indiana
Louisiana
Virginia
South Dakota
Tennessee
Maine
Mississippi
South Carolina
Texas
New Mexico
Utah
Iowa
Montana
Colorado
Georgia
Illinois
Nebraska
Oregon
New Hampshire
Hawaii
Kentucky
Connecticut
Delaware
Kansas
Alaska
Oklahoma
Missouri
Maryland
New Jersey
Wyoming
Minnesota
California
Washington
North Carolina
Rhode Island
Michigan
Idaho
Pennsylvania
D.C.
Florida
Arkansas
Massachusetts
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Vermont
$19,470
$27,868
$12,500
$6,917
$5,000
$5,000
$2,500
$2,500
$2,000
$2,000
$4,330
        $1,975
$1,100
$1,085
$1,050
$1,000
$1,000
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
$457
$450
$450
$300
$250
$200
$178
$150
$127
$125
$53
$50
$46
$30
$30
$25
$25
$22
$20
$20
$10
$10
$3
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
North Dakota does not have voter registration or a statewide voter registration file and is not included.
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While technological advances have eased access to election data for many small campaigns,
grassroots political organizations, and academia, this increased dissemination also carries a
potential cost. Advocates for privacy argue that since voter registration files contain extensive
personal information, their circulation should be carefully controlled. Others argue that voter
registration and turnout information are public records, and should be easily and cheaply available.
Arizona is one of a number of states that severely restricts access to voter registration information. It
also differs from other states in that it does not provide a statewide file — the end user must go
county to county to obtain a file. The cost element we report is based on summarizing county
information.
In Arizona, state statute ARS§16-168(E) provides for the release of voter registration files only for
purposes relating to political party activity or elections. While the state provides major political
parties with a free copy of the data, other authorized users are charged 1¢ per record (statewide, a
substantial $19,470 based on recent registration figures — and this cost was 10 times higher before
a recent change in state law). 
In 1996, the Phoenix-based Arizona Republic filed a complaint against Maricopa County and its
Recorder, Helen Purcell, after being quoted what the newspaper considered a prohibitive fee. Both
the trial and appellate courts ruled in favor of the state, the latter finding that the statute bore a
“rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective.” That court further dismissed the media
group’s claims of violation of both equal protection, and the state’s policy of access and openness.
While Arizona is currently an outlier in the fierceness of its protection of voter registration files, it is
far from the only state to erect significant barriers––financial or otherwise––to the access of this
data, and the privacy argument echoes in other states.
ACC E S S  V S .  P R I VAC Y  I N  V OT E R  R E G I S T R AT I O N  
James Hicks, Early Voting Information Center, Reed College
State Voter Information
inactives political reg reg permanent
separated? race gender party dob/age date method status
*Arizona only provides voter registration files at the county level. The price recorded here is the sum of what all counties charge: $.01 per voter. See case study for more
information.
**North Dakota has no voter registration and is therefore exempt from this comparison.
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Alabama e e e e N/A
Alaska e e N/A
Arizona* N/A
Arkansas e e e e N/A
California e e e e e e
Colorado e e e e e
Connecticut e e e e e e N/A
D.C. e e e N/A
Delaware e e e N/A
Florida e e e e e e N/A
Georgia e e e e N/A
Hawaii e e e N/A
Idaho e e e N/A
Illinois e e e e N/A
Indiana e e e e N/A
Iowa e e e e e N/A
Kansas e e e e e e N/A
Kentucky e e e e N/A
Louisiana e e e e e e N/A
Maine e e e e N/A
Maryland e e e e e N/A
Massachusetts e e e e e N/A
Michigan e e e e N/A
Minnesota e e N/A
Mississippi e e e N/A
Missouri e e e N/A
Montana e e e e
Nebraska e e e N/A
Nevada e e e e N/A
New Hampshire e N/A
New Jersey e e e N/A
New Mexico e e e e e e N/A
New York e e e e e e N/A
North Carolina e e e e e e N/A
North Dakota** N/A
Ohio e e e N/A
Oklahoma e e e e N/A
Oregon e e e e N/A
Pennsylvania e e e e e N/A
Rhode Island e e e e e N/A
South Carolina e e e e e N/A
South Dakota e e e e N/A
Tennessee e e e e e N/A
Texas e e e e N/A
Utah e e e e N/A
Vermont e e e N/A
Virginia e e e e N/A
Washington e e e e e
West Virginia e e e N/A
Wisconsin e e e e N/A
Wyoming e e N/A
Formats Available Voter History Restrictions/Requirements
.xls, .csv, data available .pdf, add'l includes Rest./ Reqs. must be registered
.txt online paper provided? charge mode? Scale (1, 2, or 3) to vote in state affidavit
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A number of states have placed restrictions on who can obtain the voter registration file. Each state has been placed into one of the following categories.
1 Unrestricted: The file is open to the public and anyone may obtain it. Sometimes an affiliation or signature is requested but is not absolutely
necessary to obtain the file. Commercial use is nearly always explicitly prohibited.
2 Somewhat Restricted: The file is restricted to those who are affiliated in some way with a political campaign or party, academic institution or some
other organization. Description of affiliation is usually required. A file that requires an affidavit also fall into this category. Commercial use is nearly
always explicitly prohibited.
3 Very Restricted: The file is restricted only to political campaigns, candidates, parties or to those using the information for governmental purposes only.
This category also includes states that require the requestor to be a registered voter in that state. Commercial use is nearly always explicitly prohibited.
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The EAC, under Section 202 of the Help America
Vote Act, acts as a clearinghouse for information
on election administration in the United States.
As part of that responsibility, the EAC is required
to submit three reports to Congress, on the
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting
Act (UOCAVA), and the Election Day Survey (EDS). 
The EAC has chosen to collect this information by
administering a survey to the states and local
jurisdictions. The survey is a federally mandated
data collection instrument that includes questions
about state compliance with NVRA, UOCAVA and
also includes an election day component. The
reports on the three surveys, as well as the raw
data, are available at the EAC website.49
The EAC survey holds the potential to be an
invaluable data resource for the elections reform
community. If the survey were disseminated on a
timely basis, and if all states made an effort to
respond as fully as possible, it would be possible
to compare the number of registered voters, the
number of voters removed from the rolls,
compliance with NVRA, accessibility to the ballot
by UOCAVA voters, levels of early and absentee
voting and implementation of provisional voting
laws. In short, some, though not all, of the needs
outlined by the essayists in the Data for
Democracy compendium would be met.
Sadly, as the tables on the next pages illustrate,
the EAC survey is far from meeting this standard.
Non-response rates on some sections of the
survey are so high that using the survey in any
comparative context is impossible. This is a
situation that must be rectified in the future.
The response rates on the various sections of the
EAC surveys vary dramatically due to some
design flaws. The 2006 survey was set up so that
counties were the unit of analysis. But in New
England, as in Michigan, Wisconsin and
Minnesota, elections are administered at the
township level. The survey included items on
NVRA compliance for all states even though
North Dakota was exempt from the NVRA since it
does not require votes to register. And the
Election Day Survey asked detailed questions
about election results for all federal offices — a
section of the survey that virtually no states
responded to.
To adjust for these sources of non-response, the
figures and tables include what we call the
“adjusted” response rate. To create these response
rates, we examined the survey question by
question. If a question was answered by less than
half of the counties in the nation, we chose not
to include this when we compared response
rates state by state.
Response Rates on the 
2006 Election Administration
Commission Survey
Paul Gronke and Bailey Schreiber, Early Voting Information Center, Reed College
As shown in the bar chart, using a response
threshold is essential in order to obtain a
reasonable comparison. If we considered all
items, the response rate on the EDS survey is
below 10 percent. This indicates that there were
many items on the EDS with no responses (these
were the federal election results mentioned
above). If you set the threshold just to greater
than 0 percent, the average response rate on the
EDS survey nearly triples.
The graphic makes clear why 50 percent is a
reasonable response threshold. It means that we
consider only items on which more than half of
the counties in the country provided a response.
It is also a threshold that results in roughly
comparable response rates across the three
portions of the survey. We also do not want to set
a threshold that is so high that it implies that all
counties responded to all items. (For those
interested, the unadjusted response rates are
included in the appendix.) 
Finally, and not surprisingly, the graphic shows that
states respond at the highest rate to the NVRA
portion of the survey. This is not surprising since
the NVRA survey has been conducted for the
longest period of time (from 1996 until 2004, it was
conducted by the Federal Election Commission).
The response rates overall vary dramatically. While
half the states responded to more than 75 percent
of the items, the response rates among some other
states was much lower. Five states responded to
less than half the items (although four of these
were states that conduct elections at the township
55Improving Elections Through Metrics and Measurement
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EAC RESPONSE RATES BY ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE THRESHOLDS
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UOCAVA
EDS
All items 0% 25% 50% 75%
NVRA 65.0% 65.0% 65.0% 68.8% 95.4%
UOCAVA 49.2% 49.2% 49.2% 74.2% 96.2%
EDS 9.3% 26.4% 51.0% 74.9% 88.2%
The table entries and bar chart report the national response rates on the EAC survey. Because some survey items were responded to by very few counties, we are able to
adjust the national average by considering only survey items that some proportion of counties responded to—what we refer to as the threshold. To illustrate, the 51% in
column 3 means that, when we only include EDS survey items responded to by more than 25% of the counties, the overall response rate on the EDS portion of the survey is
51.0%.
level, and therefore had a geographic mismatch
between a county-based survey and their own
geographic basis of elections).
Rather than shaming those states that failed to
respond to many items, it is encouraging to
highlight those states that responded to nearly all
the items in the survey. Alaska, Delaware, Georgia,
Louisiana, Montana and Ohio responded to 98
percent or more of the survey items. These states
are not from a particular region, nor do they all
have a low number of counties or a small
population. Three have small populations and
two have large populations. Two are
geographically large and one (Delaware) is quite
small. Georgia and Ohio have a large number of
counties; Louisiana and Montana has an average
number of counties (64 and 56 respectively),
while Delaware has only 3. (Alaska reported its
information statewide.)
Other states that responded to more than 90
percent of the items on the survey are Florida,
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and North
Carolina, along with the protectorate of American
Samoa. 
While Georgia receives the gold medal — it
responded to nearly every item we considered —
this larger group of 12 states are the national
leaders, at least according to the lens provided by
the EAC survey. 
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ADJUSTED RESPONSE RATES ON EAC 2006 SURVEY
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State NVRA UOCAVA EDS Total State NVRA UOCAVA EDS Total
Alabama 34% 49% 41% 41% Nevada 63% 90% 86% 79%
Alaska 88% 100% 100% 96% New Hampshire 19% 37% 58% 38%
Arizona 93% 83% 85% 87% New Jersey 68% 90% 91% 83%
Arkansas 94% 82% 76% 84% New Mexico 63% 62% 58% 61%
California 74% 74% 73% 73% New York 80% 59% 81% 74%
Colorado 95% 97% 77% 89% North Carolina 85% 99% 96% 93%
Connecticut 59% 41% 50% 51% North Dakota 19% 100% 100% 100%
Delaware 94% 100% 100% 98% Ohio 98% 99% 99% 98%
Dist. of Col. 65% 64% 54% 61% Oklahoma 96% 72% 78% 83%
Florida 91% 98% 94% 94% Oregon 83% 64% 69% 72%
Georgia 100% 100% 99% 100% Pennsylvania 100% 44% 51% 66%
Hawaii 78% 74% 69% 74% Rhode Island 81% 60% 57% 66%
Idaho 35% 100% 92% 74% South Carolina 42% 57% 66% 55%
Illinois 81% 61% 62% 69% South Dakota 80% 77% 78% 78%
Indiana 70% 77% 69% 72% Tennessee 83% 53% 54% 64%
Iowa 96% 91% 90% 92% Texas 99% 77% 77% 85%
Kansas 66% 81% 73% 73% Utah 54% 93% 90% 78%
Kentucky 39% 72% 79% 63% Vermont 42% 49% 50% 47%
Louisiana 100% 100% 91% 97% Virginia 35% 89% 81% 67%
Maine 65% 73% 73% 70% Washington 72% 86% 89% 82%
Maryland 100% 91% 92% 94% West Virginia 58% 76% 79% 70%
Massachusetts 64% 36% 21% 41% Wisconsin 23% 55% 54% 43%
Michigan 89% 91% 92% 91% Wyoming 52% 91% 93% 78%
Minnesota 46% 68% 61% 58% American Samoa 85% 100% 100% 95%
Mississippi 53% 72% 71% 65% Guam 19% 32% 15% 22%
Missouri 98% 91% 92% 94% Puerto Rico 19% 32% 15% 22%
Montana 95% 100% 100% 98% Virgin Islands 50% 91% 88% 76%
Nebraska 86% 70% 73% 77%
The map reports the adjusted response rates for the complete EAC survey. The adjusted response rates remove survey items on which large proportions of the counties did 
not respond, as noted in the text. The separate columns in the table refer to separate portions of the EAC survey, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), and the Election Day Survey (EDS).
The state of North Dakota does not have voter registration and is therefore exempt from the National Voter Registration Act portion of the EAC Assessment. If the NVRA survey
items are considered North Dakota would has a score of 79.8 percent. There are only seven states that allow voters to register on Election Day: Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Wisconsin and Wyoming. All other states are exempt from questions regarding election-day registration. There were a number of states that provided data at the
state level in addition to countywide data. Survey items for which there was only a statewide response were given a response rate of 100 percent for that response. New
England, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin administer elections at the township level. In its administration of the surveys, the EAC assumed the county as the election
jurisdiction. Low response rates in these states may be due to mismatch of geographic components of the survey and actual administration.
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May 12-13, 2008 
Pew Charitable Trusts
1025 F Street, NW
Washington DC 
Monday, May 12 
12:00 p.m. Informal Lunch
1:00 p.m. Introductions
Michael Caudell-Feagan, Make Voting Work
Paul Gronke, Reed College 
1:30 p.m. Why Data Matters
The opening session will discuss the importance of high-quality empirical data in
managing elections and framing questions of public policy and opinion. 
Doug Chapin, Electionline.org 
2:00 p.m. How Data Is Used
This session will discuss the importance and use of election data to inform the efforts of
policymakers, academics, advocates and political campaigns. 
Moderator:
Paul Gronke, Reed College
Presenters:
Michael Herron, Dartmouth
Eric Fischer, Congressional Research Service
Justin Levitt, Brennan Center for Justice
Chris Mann, MSHC Partners, Inc.  
3:00 p.m. How Data Is Collected
This session will discuss sources of election data, collection methods, and the differences
between collecting election data and the standard expectations of survey research. 
Moderator/Presenter:
Toby Moore, Research Triangle Institute 
Presenters:
Charles Stewart, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Kelly Patterson, Brigham Young University 
Cathy McCully, U.S. Bureau of the Census
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4:00 p.m. Data for Management
This session will spotlight case studies of election officials’ efforts to incorporate data
collection and analysis into their operations. 
Moderator: 
Alysoun McLaughlin, Make Voting Work
Presentations:
Matt Damschroder, Franklin County, Ohio
Bob Murphy, Maryland State Board of Elections 
Tammy Patrick, Maricopa County, Arizona
Dean Logan, Los Angeles County, California
6:30 p.m. Dinner
Wine Room, Chef Geoff ’s Downtown
1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. (on 13th Street between E and F)
Tuesday, May 13 
8:45 a.m. Continental Breakfast
9:00 a.m. Voter Registration *
EAC Data Items 1-4b, Statutory Review 2, 6-10 
This session deals with the basics of the statewide voter registration files. What is the
essential information that should be provided by states in these files? How accessible
should this information be? How are active and inactive voters handled state by state?
The focus is not on the accuracy of data but on the necessary ingredients for
meaningful data analysis. 
Moderator/Presenter:
Michael McDonald, George Mason University
Respondent:
Wendy Noren, Boone County, Missouri 
9:45 a.m. National Voter Registration Act* 
EAC Data Items 5-9, Statutory Review 2, 11-15 
A great deal of attention has been focused on how citizens are added to—and
removed from—the voter rolls. How can we develop good data on use of the
procedures specified in NVRA? 
Moderator/Presenter:
Michael Hanmer, University of Maryland
Respondents:
Michael Slater, Project Vote 
Keith Cunningham, Allen County, Ohio 
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10:30 a.m. Military and Overseas Voters*
EAC Data Items 10-13, Statutory Review (none) 
One of the more challenging data sections in the EAC survey for both 2004 and 2006
was UOCAVA. Many states say flat out that they have great difficulty tracking UOCAVA
voters, and there are federal regulations that make the problem even worse. 
Moderator/Presenter:
Kim Brace, Election Data Services
Respondents:
Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat, Overseas Vote Foundation
Pat Hollarn, Okaloosa County, Florida 
11:15 a.m. Election Results*
EAC Data Items 18a-19, 25a-25e, 29 Statutory Review 2, 16, 22 
To many, the most fundamental data element of all—election results—is, ironically, one
that plays a relatively small role in the EAC survey. Should the survey include a much
more substantial section on federal election results? Should they ask about overvotes
and undervotes? Do we want turnout and if so, from what source (pollbooks, highest
office, etc.)? 
Moderator/Presenter:
Karin Mac Donald, University of California-Berkeley 
Respondents:
Steve Weir, Contra Costa County, California
Joy Streater, Comal County, Texas 
Clark Bensen, POLIDATA
12:00 p.m. Lunch
1:00 p.m. Voting Technology *
EAC Data Items 14-17, 25a-28, Statutory Review (none) 
What do we know about voting technology and how can the questions on the EAC
survey be improved to better our understanding? 
Moderator/Presenter:
Paul Herrnson, University of Maryland 
Respondents:
Tammy Patrick, Maricopa County, Arizona
David Beirne, Election Technology Council
Pam Smith, Verified Voting 
Data for Democracy | Pew Center on the States60
A P P E N D I X
1:45 p.m. Absentee and Early Voting*
EAC Data Items 20-24, Statutory Review 2, 4, 16-21 
States vary widely in how they collect and report data on votes cast by mail or prior to
election day. Should the EAC collect more of this information? Is it enough just to know
how many ballots came from precincts, absentee and “other”? 
Moderator/Presenter:
John Fortier, American Enterprise Institute 
Respondents:
Bill Huennekens, King County, Washington
Gary Smith, Forsyth County, Georgia 
2:30 p.m. Break
2:45 p.m. Provisional Ballots*
EAC Data Items 20-24, Statutory Review 2, 4, 16-21 
How are provisional ballots accepted and when are they rejected? How can states
better track this information? 
Moderator/Presenter:
Ned Foley, Ohio State University
Respondents:
David Kimball, University of Missouri-St. Louis
Dean Logan, Los Angeles County, California
Matt Damschroder, Franklin County, Ohio
3:30-4:30 Wrap Up and Discussion
* For these sessions, conference participants are assigned to working groups. Each working group will draft a memo on the
topic for circulation prior to the conference. Each working group has an assigned team leader who will be responsible for
presenting the memo at this session, incorporating feedback from working group participants and conference attendees and
preparing a paper on the topic for a Compendium in the weeks following the conference. 
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UNADJUSTED RESPONSE RATES ON THE 2006 EAC SURVEY
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State NVRA UOCAVA EDS Total State NVRA UOCAVA EDS Total
Alabama 29% 17% 3% 7% Nevada 59% 74% 11% 23%
Alaska 90% 78% 14% 28% New Hampshire 16% 12% 4% 6%
Arizona 91% 79% 16% 30% New Jersey 70% 65% 13% 24%
Arkansas 92% 63% 12% 24% New Mexico 58% 43% 8% 17%
California 70% 41% 8% 16% New York 80% 23% 7% 14%
Colorado 94% 57% 9% 21% North Carolina 75% 58% 11% 22%
Connecticut 52% 14% 5% 9% North Dakota 16% 94% 18% 28%
Delaware 92% 100% 18% 35% Ohio 95% 87% 17% 32%
Dist. of Col. 65% 71% 12% 24% Oklahoma 90% 36% 8% 17%
Florida 92% 98% 18% 34% Oregon 73% 62% 14% 25%
Georgia 103% 92% 16% 32% Pennsylvania 96% 21% 5% 13%
Hawaii 78% 43% 8% 17% Rhode Island 79% 33% 6% 15%
Idaho 34% 94% 13% 26% South Carolina 38% 22% 5% 10%
Illinois 77% 27% 5% 13% South Dakota 75% 58% 9% 20%
Indiana 62% 35% 6% 13% Tennessee 73% 24% 4% 12%
Iowa 97% 40% 10% 20% Texas 95% 62% 11% 24%
Kansas 56% 43% 8% 16% Utah 50% 80% 13% 24%
Kentucky 42% 76% 16% 26% Vermont 35% 17% 3% 7%
Louisiana 100% 48% 8% 20% Virginia 29% 36% 8% 13%
Maine 59% 29% 10% 16% Washington 72% 79% 17% 29%
Maryland 93% 62% 15% 27% West Virginia 55% 32% 6% 13%
Massachusetts 59% 13% 2% 8% Wisconsin 22% 25% 4% 8%
Michigan 84% 85% 16% 30% Wyoming 50% 91% 17% 30%
Minnesota 48% 40% 5% 13% American Samoa 84% 91% 17% 32%
Mississippi 49% 53% 10% 18% Guam 16% 11% 1% 3%
Missouri 98% 64% 9% 22% Puerto Rico 16% 11% 1% 3%
Montana 96% 98% 18% 35% Virgin Islands 48% 40% 8% 15%
Nebraska 81% 31% 7% 15%
The map reports the response rates for the total EAC survey. This table does not remove any items on which large proportions of the counties did not respond, as noted in 
the text. The separate columns in the table refer to separate portions of the EAC survey, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), and the Election Day Survey (EDS). Additional information on the map and table are contained on page 57.
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